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Among the important events which have marked the
monetary history of the past generation has been the
steady progress toward the gold standard in commercial
countries, until to-d.a-^ other systems have practically
"been superseded or abandoned in favor of some form of
m^ney ^sed upon gold. The development of our money
and of our existing monetary system has been the result
of a long evolution extending from the eattle mone7r of
prehistoric times down to the perfected gold coin ^nd
check and. deposit system of to-day. The progress of
this evolution has followed the principle of marginal
utility, which has been so successfully applied to the
solution of economic problems, "but was not until recently
applied in detail to the subject of gold.
The chief justification I have for writing this
thesis is th^t I firmly Relieve the economic development
of the United States h»s centered around the gold standard
mo^e than any ether single thing. Many problems which a
generation a~o appeared ebscure have been solved uy the
efficiency of gold a<* a money standard. Probably the
single greatest proof of gold as an economic developer
is the fact that every leading commercial nation in the
world is on a gold monetary basis.
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1.
FINANCIAL CONDITION OF COUNTRY AT TIME OP
SEVERANCE FROM ENGLAND
The colonies went into the Revolutions ry War, many
of them with paper already in circulation, all of them
making issues for the expenses of military prepare tions
.
The Continental Congress, having no power to tax, and. its
members being accustomed to paper issues ss the ordinary
form of public finance, began to issue bills on the faith
of the Continent, Franklin earnestly approving. The first
issue for 300,000 Spanish dollars was redeemable in gold
or silver at the end of three years. They were ordered in
May and issued in August, 1775. Paper for nine million
dollars was issued before any depreciation began. The
issues of the separate colonies must have affected it. but
1
the popular enthusiasm went fo^ something. Pelatiah Webster,
almost alone as it seems, insisted or taxation, but a rr-ember
of Congress indignantly asked if he was to help tax people
when they could go to the printing-office and get a cartload
of money. In 1776, when the depreciation began, Congress
took harsh measures to punish those who forestalled or en-
grossed, these being the terms for speculators who bought
for a rise.
During the summer of 1780 this wretched Continental
currency fell into contempt. As Washington said, it took
a wagon-load of 'money to buy a wagon-load of provisions.
1. W.G. Sumner, History of American Currency, pp. 43-44.

At the end of the year, 1778, the paper dollar was
worth sixteen cents in the northern states and twelve
cents in the south. Early in 1780 its value h^d fallen to
two cents, and before the end of the year it took ten paper
dollars to make a cent. In October, Indian corn sold for
$150. a bushel, butter w«s $12. a pound, tea $90, sugar
$10, beef $8, coffee $12, and a barrel of flour cost $1575.
Samuel Adams paid ^2000. for a hat and a suit of clothes.
The money soon ceased to circulate, debts could not be
collected, and there was a general prostration of credit.
Before the close of the year, 1780, the Continental
currency had ceased to circulate. Attempts were subse-
quently made to have it funded or redeemed, but without
1
success. During the Kevolutionary period metallic money
remained in the confusion of the colonial period. Various
foreign coins circulated side by side, ps the English guinea,
crown, and shilling; the French guinea, pistole, and crown;
the Spanish pistole; and the Johannes, half Johannes, and
moidre; and unequal values were given in different parts of
the Union to coins of the pfr-e intrinsic worth, thus afford-
ing opportunity for clipping and fraudulent change. Various
units of account were employed in different sections of the
country, which tended to obscure a clear understanding of the
economic condition of the several States.
1. D.R. Dewey, Financial History of the U.S. p. 101
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The Articles of Confederation when they went into
effect in 1781 did not contribute much to remove the
complice tions
,
for, though Congress h^d power to regu-
late the alloy and value of coins, struck either by its
authority or by th^t of the States, the right to coin
money was ?till retained by the States.
1780-1784:- Pennsylvania Bank, Bsr.k of Worth Arrerica,
and Bank of New York. The Pennsylvania Bank, which was
organized in Philadelphia.
,
during the Revolutionary War,
was founded for the purpose of facilitating the operations
of the Government in transporting supplies for the Ar-my.
It began its useful work in 1780, and continued in exist-
ence until after the close of the w^r: finally closing its
affair? toward the end of the yea^- 1784. But the need was
felt fo^ a national 1 ank which should n<~t on! y aid the
Government on a large scale by its money and ©redit, but
should extend facilities to individuals, and thereby benefit
the community as well as the State. Through the influence and
exertion of Robert ^orris, then Superintendent of Finance
for the United States, the Bank of ^orth America at Phila-
delphia, was organized with a capital of #400,000, It was
incorporated by Congress in December, 1781, and by the State
of Pennsylvania a few month? afterwards. Its success was
immediate and complete. It not only rendered valuable and
timely aid to the United State? Government and to the State
of Pennsylvania, but it greatly as?i?ted in restoring con-
fidence and credit to the commercial community, and afforded
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facilities to orivste enterprises that were esreci^ily
welcome. The success of the Bank of North America, and
the advantages which the citi pens of Philadelphia enjoy-
ed from the facilities it offered them, naturally SUggeSt-
ed the founding of a similar enterprise in the City of New
York. The Bank of New York was accordingly founded in
1784.
1782-1792:- Establishment of the United States Mint.
Several reports- had been made on the subject of coinage,
the first of which was by Robert Morris, January 15, 1782.
The subject of coinage was exhaustively considered by
Hamilton in a report submitted to Congress in May, 1791, in
which he stood for a unit e ''pressed in both gold ^nd silver.
For certain reap6nS, he held that it w- s not safe to bridge
the ouantity of circulating medium by annulling the use of
silver. He recommended, that the mint ration between gold and
silver be 1 to 15 a proportion corresponding to the bullion
values at that time and prrposed that the monetary unit
consist of 29f grains of pure gold, or 37- grains of ~ure
silver, the amount of silver corresponding a s nearly a s could
be determined with that of the Spanish dollar in actual cir-
culation, e-n ch answering to a dollar in the money of
account. In accordance with this plan, Hamilton recommended
the coina.p-e of ten dollar and one dollar gold pieces, one
dollar and ten cent silver pieces, and one cent and one-
half cent copper pieces. There is nothing whatever in
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Hamilton's report which countenances silver mono-
metallism • gold, as well as silver was recognized as
an actual standard of value at the time, and Hamilton's
efforts were directed to determining a ratio between gold
and silver w ich should bring uniformity out of disorder
occasioned by the silver coinage then current. The Mint
Act of April 2, 1792, substantially followed tv e suggest-
ions of Hamilton, omitting, however, any provision for
t e coinage of a gold dollar. Because the re. was no dis-
tinct provision for the coinage of a gold, dollar, it has
been hastily concluded by advocates of silver coinage that
the original unit of value was the silver dollar. The
error has resulted from not observing that there are
different kinds of units, 'l'he word unit as employed in
the Mint Act refers to a unit of numbers, and not, as
1
crudely interpreted, to a unit of value. The act of
1792 has indeed nr>een given greater prominence than it
deserves, for the eurrencfy ouestion at that time did not
arouse much Interest, There was more discussion in Con-
gress over the expense of establishing and maintaining a
mint than there was over the ratio or the choice of metals.
1790-1816:- First ^ank of the United States. On the
organization of the government of fctae United States, under
its federal constitution, in 1789 and 1790, the lead, in
1. D. R. Dewey, Financial History of the U. S. p. 103.

constructive statesmanship was taken, as is well known,
by Alexander Hamilton. His plan included a financial
institution to develop th^ natural resources, strengthen
the public credit, aid the treasury Deportment in its
administration, and provide a secure and sound circulat-
ing medium for the people. On December 13, 1790, he sent
into Congress a report concerning tbe subject of a nation-
al bank. The Republican party, then in the minority, opposed
the measure as unconstitutional, on tbe ground that the
power of creating banks or a corporate body had not been
expressly delegated to Congress, and was therefore not
possessed w3 th it. Washington's cabinet was divided;
Jefferson opposing the plan as not within the implied
powers, because it was an expediency and not a paramount
necessity. Later he used stronger language, and denounced
the institution ps one of the most hostile agenc^e* exist-
ing against tbe principles and f~rm of our Constitution.
1
There is the authority of Mr. Gallatin for raying that
Jefferson d'ed a decided enemy to our banking system generall
and especially to a bank of the United States. But Hamiltcn '
views prevailed. Washington who in the weary years of war
had seen the imperative necessity of some national organiza-
tion of the finances, after mature deliberation approved
the plan, and on February 25, 1791, the Bank of the United
States was incorporated. The capital stock was limited to
1. The New Larned History, p. 5814.

twenty-five thousand shares of four hundred dollars
each, or ten millions of dollars, payable one fourth
in gold and silver, and three fourths in public utili-
ties, bearing an interest of six and three per cent.
The stock was immediately subscribed fo"1", the gov ram en t
taking five thousand shares, two millions of dollars,
under the right reserved in the charter. The subscription
of the United °tates was paid in ten eaual annual in-
stallments. A lPrge proportion of the stock was held
abroad, and the shares soon rose above p»r. Authority w*>s
given the. bank to establish offices of discount and deposit
within the United States. The chief bank was placed in
Philadelphia and branches were established in eight cities,
with capitals in proportion to their commercial importance.
In 1809 the stockholders of the Bank of the United
States memorialized the government for a renewal of their
charter, which would expire on March 4, 1811, and on March
9, 1809, Mr. Gallatin sent in a report in which he reviewed
the operation of the bank from its organi7ation . A table of
all the dividends made by the bank showed that they had, on
the average, been at the rate of eight and three eighths
per cent a 7/ear, which proved that the bank h^d not in any
considerable degree -ised the public deposits for the purpose
of extending its d-' ^counts. From s renera"! view o"^ t'^e
debits and. credits, "s presented, it appe^ed that the affal
of the Bank of the United States, considered *s a money in-
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stitution, had been wisely and skillfully managed. The
advantages derived by the government, Ft*. Gallatin stated
to be:
1. Safe -keeping of the public -moneys
.
2. Transmission of the public -moneys
3. Collection of the Revenue.
4. Loans.
The strongest objection to the renewal of the charter lay
in the greet portion of the bank stock held by foreigners.
Not on account of any influence over the institution, since
they had no vote; but because of the high rate of interest
payable by America to foreign countries. Congress refused
to prolong its existence and the institution was dissolved.
Fortunately for the Country, it wound up its affairs with
such deliberation and prudence as to allow of the inter-
position of other bank credits in lieu of those withdrawn,
and thus prevented a serious ^hock to the inte^e^t of the
community. In t v e twenty ye^rs of its existence from 1791
tp 1211 its management ws»s irreproachable. The immediate
effect of the refusal of Congress to rech»rter the Bank of
the United. States we s t~* bring the treasury to the verge of
bankruptcy. The interference of Parish, Girard, and Astor
alone saved the credit of the government. Another Immediate
effect of the dissolution of the bank was the withdrawal
from the country of the foreign capital invested in the bank,
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more than seven millions of dollars. Thi^ amount was re-
mitted, in the twelve Months preceeding the war, in specie.
Specie was at that time a product foreign to the United
States, and by no mears easy to obtain.
The notes of the Bank of the United States, payable
on demand In gold or silver at the counters of the bank,
or any of its branches, were, by its charter, receivable
in all payments to the United States; but this ouality was
also stripped from them on March 19, 1812, by a repeal of
the act according it. To these disturbances of the financial
equilibrium of the country was added the necessary with-
drawal of fi "teen millions of ba^k credit and its transfer
to other institutions. 5?hia gave an extraordinary impulse
to the establishment of local hanks, each eager for a sbare
of the profits. The capital of the countr-, instead of being
concentrated was dissipated. Between January 1, 1811, and
1815, one hundred and twenty new banks -"ere chaptered, and
forty millions of dollars -''ere added to the banking capital.
To realize profits, the issues of parier were pushed to the
extreme of possible circulation. Meanwhile New England kept
aloof from the nation. The specie in the vaults of the banks
of Massachusetts rose from ^1,706,000 on June 1, 1811 to
$7,326,000 on June 1, 1814. The suspension of the banks waa
precipitated by the capture of Washington. It began in
Baltimore, which was threatened by the British, and was at
once followed in Philadelphia and fiew York.
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Before the end of September all the bank?? south
and west of ^ew England h^d suspended specie payment.
The depression of the- local cur^encie'- ranged from
seven to twenty-five per cent. In November the Treasury
Department found itself involved in the common disaster.
The refusal of t l e banks, in which the public moneys were
deposited, to pay their note? for the drafts upon them,
in specie, deprived the government of its gold and silver:
and their refusal, likewise, of credit and circulation to
the issues of banks in other States, also deprived t^e
government of the only means it possessed for transferring
its funds in order to pay the dividends on the debt and
discharge the treasury notes. On October 14, 1814, Alexander
J. Dallas, Mr, Sails tin's old friend, who had been appointed
Secretary of the Treasury on the sixth of the same month,
in a report of 1 a plan to support the public credit, pro-
posed the incorporation of a nationa 1 bank. A bill wps
passed by °ongres^. but returned to it by Madison with
his veto on January 15, 1815. Mr. Dallas, again, as a last
resort, insisted, on a bank as the only means by which the
currency of the country co ,; ld be restored to a sound con-
dition. In December, 1815, ^allas reported to a Committee,
of which John C.Calhoun was chairman, appointed by the House
of Representatives concerning the subject of a national
currency, a plan for a national bank. On March 3, 1816, the
second Bank of the United States was chartered by Congress.

11.
The capital was thirty-five millions, of which the govern-
ment held seven millions, in seventy-thousand shares of
one hundred dollars e^ch. Mr. Madison approved the hill.
The Second National -ank of the United States was located
at Philadelphia, and chartered for twenty years.
1817-1833:- Second Bank of the United States and the
War Upon it. On the first of January, 181V, the bank opened
for business, with the country on the brink of a great mone-
tary crisis, but too late to prevent the crash which followed.
The management of the bank during the first two years of its
existence was far from satisfactory. It aggravated the
troubles of the financial situation instead, of relieving them.
Specie payments were nominally resumed in 1817, but the in-
sidious cancer of Inflation had eaten its way into the ar-
teries of business, and in the crisis of 1819 came another
suspension that lasted for two years. It was only by a
desperate effort that the bank finally weathered t 1r,e storm
brought on by its own mismanagement and that of the State
Banks. After the recover? r
,
a period of several years of
prosper! t'- followed, and the management of the ^ank was
thoroughly organized and sound. Prom this t^'me on until the
gre^t rank War its affair? seem to have heen conducted with
a view to performing its duty to the government as -"ell «s
to its individual stock-holders, and it rendered such aid to
the public, directly and indirectly, as entitled it to
the respect and fair treatment on the part of the servants
of the people. But t e bank controversy w«. s not over.
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1
It was about to "be revived, and to "become a
prominent issue in a period of our national politics
more distinguished for the bitterness of its personal
animosities than perhaps any other in our annals. As
already said, the ten yeen following the revulsion of
1819-1825 were veers of almost unbroken prosperity. In
fact, scarcely any mention of the subject was made until
President Jpckson referred to it in his message of Dec-
ember, 1829. In this message he reopened the question
of the constitutionality of the bank, but V: e Committee
to which this portion of the message was referred in the
House of representatives made a report favorable to the
institution. There seems no reason to doubt the honesty
of ^ackson's opinion that the charter of the bank was un-
constitutional, and at first he probpbl;/- had no feelings
in the matter except that which sprang from his convictions
on this point. Certain events, however, increased his hos-
tility to the bank, and strengthened Ms resolution to des-
troy it.
The question of rechartering the bank was made an
issue, in the presidential campaign of 1832, by Henry Clay.
Its disinterested friends in both parties strongly dis-
suaded Biddle, (president of the bank) from allowing the
Question of recharter to be brought into the campaign.
Clay's advisers tried to dissuade him. The bank, however,
could n~ t oppose the public man on whom it depended most,
1. D. Kinley, Independent Treasury of the U.S. Chap. 1.
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and the party leaders deferred at last to their chief.
Jackson was never more dictatorial and obstinate
than Clay was at this .juncture. Pending the election,
a bill to renew the charter of the bank was passed through
both houses of Congress. The President promptly vetoed
it. The national republican convention met at Baltimore
December 12, 1851. It issued an sddress, in which the
bank Question was put forward. It declared that the Presi-
dent was pledged to the people to veto any bill that may
be passed for r*echart©ring the bank; and thee was little
doubt that the additional influence which he would ^couire
by reelection would be employed to carry through Congress
the extraordinary substitute which he had repeatedly pro-
posed. The appeal, therefore, was to defeat Jackson in
order to save the bank. Such a challenge as that could
have but one effect cn Jackson. It called every faculty
he possessed into activity to compass the destruction of
the bank. instead of retiring from the position he had
taken, the moment there was a fight to be fought, he did
what he did. at New Orleans. He moved his lines up to the
last point he could command on the side towards the enemy.
The proceedings seemed to prove Just what the anti-bank
men had asserted: that the bank was a great monster, wMch
aimed to control the elections ard to set up and rut down
new Presidents.
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1
The campaign of 1832 was a struggle between the
popularity of the bank and the popularity of Jackson*
Jackson w»a overwhelmingly elected, and feeling convinced
th^t his -ar upon the banks had received the approval of
the people, he determined to remove the public deposits
from its keeping on Ms own responsibility. With this
view he removed, (in the sprang of 1832) the Secretary of
the Treasury who ^o^ld not consent to remove the deposits,
and appointed William J. Duane , of Penns7flvani p , in Ms
place. He proved to be of no more compliabilit?/ than his
predecessor. After many attempts to persuade him, the
President announced to the Cabinet, his final decision,
2
that the deposits, must be removed. The reasons given
were that the law gave the Secretary, not Congress, control
of the deposits, and that it we s improper to leave them
longer in a la nk whose charter would so soon expire, that
the Bank's funds had been largely used for political pur-
poses, that its inability to pay all its depositors had
been shown by its efforts to procure an extension of time
from its cred^'to^s in Europe, and that its fou^ government
directors had been systematically kept from knowledge of
its management. Secretary Duane refused either to remove
the deposits or to resign his office, and pronounced the
proposed removal unnecessary, unwise, vindictive, arbitary
and unjust.
1. W, G. Sumner, Andrew Jackson, Chapter 11.
2. A. Johnston, History of American Politics, Chap. 13.
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He was at once removed from office, and Roger B.
Taney, of Maryland, appointed in his pl?ce. The
necessary orders for removal were given by Secretary
Taney. It was not strictly a removal, for all previous
deposits were left in the Bank, to be drawn upon until
exhausted. It v/as rather a cessation. The deposits
were afterwards mr-de in various State banks and the
Bank of the United States ws s compelled to call in its
loans. The commercial distress wh'ch followed in con-
seauence probably strengthened tY e Pre r i dent in the end
by giving a convincing proof of the Bank's nower as an
antagonist to the Government.

II
TH E PREVISION 0 F PROGRES S
A new policy was adopted in the United States by the
act of June 28, 1834, This act changed the ratio "between
1
gold and silver from 15 to 1 to 16 to 1. This Change wafl
accomplished by lowering the weight of the gold eagle from
270 to 258 grains of standard gold. The weight of the
silver dollar and the amount of silver which it contained
were left uncharged, but the dollar was practically dis-
carded by giving it a lower value at the mint in ^elation
to gold than the value of the bullion which it contained.
The mint was thus thrown open to the free coinape of both
metals, and it has been contended by many American M-
metallists that the system of 1834 established bimetallism
in the United States. Upon this point, however, so in-
telligent and careful a bimetallist as Walker declares;-
2
A fair trial of bimetallism, under reasonably favorable
conditions, could not possibly, in the nature of the c-°se,
have been conducted here. The people of this country,
throughout the period under consideration, habitually used
so small an amount of either or both of the precious metals,
in comparison with other nations, and in comparison with
the stock of these metals throughout the world, that a
bimetallic law here instituted could not have afforded a
fair trial of bimetallism.
Walker further declares that: "The manner in which
bimetallism was put into operation here by the act of
1. Con. McLaughlin, Bimetallism in the U. S. p. 73
2. International Bimetallism, p. 112.
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1834 was such as necessarily to bring about an e^rly
failure, even though the principle of bimetallism wa
s
admitted to be perfectly sound." He bases this state-
ment partly upon the selection by Hamilton of a ratio
which was different from that of Prance and wps differ-
ent from the market ratio. 1hi s ratio, as established
by the act of April 2, 1792, waa 15 to 1. Gold was
undervalued with the result that little was brought to
the mints and much exported. It had been the intention
of Hamilton to establish the double standard, because
he did not believe that the United States was r' ch
1
enough tc retain a gold currency. The fall in the value
of silver, however, caused it to be used in paying debts,
and from 1792 to 1834 made it practically the standard
of monetary transactions.
1874-1?90:- Resumption of Specie Payment in the
United States. The political consequences of the panic
of 1873 were seen in the autumn of 1874 when the con-
gressional elections, for the first time since 1860, went
against the Republican party. Under the pressure of
political necessity (inspired in part by the vigorous
tone of Grant's veto, and by the positive demands of
Eristow, who succeeded Ric^a^dson, as Secretary of the
Treasury), a bill was enacted for the resurrtion of
specie payments by the expiring Cnngre 0 ?, January 14, 1876
while the Republicans still held power to rally to Its
1. Paper money and banking in the U.S. p. 107
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1
support sufficient votes for its passage. The meas-
ure was loaded with a variety of provisions: 1. A
system of free banking: 2. The retirement of green-
backs equal to eighty per cent of the amount of new
national bank-notes issued, until the greenback cir-
culation should be reduced to ?'300,000.000. «fter which
no further reduction of the green -backp was to take
place. It was argued that this check would prevent either
expansion or contraction of tie currency as nearly
twenty per cent of the notes were already held, ps hank
reserves: 3,, The withdrawal of paper fractional currency
and substitution of silver coin; 4. Removal of the charge
for the renewal of gold: 5. Resumption of specie payments
on January 1, 1879. For this purpose the treasury was
authorized to use the surplus specie in the treasury, and,
if necessary, to sell bonds of the classes authorized
under the act of July 14, 18^0, in order to obtain addi-
tional gold. The legal-tender quality of both green-b^cks
and national ha^k-nr-tes remained unchanged. The act
remained practically inoperative so f^r as the proposition
for immediate resumption was concerned. Secretar- Br^ stow
in 1875-18'7 6 did not favor the policy of accumulatirg
gold in p reserve, as he deprecated the loss of interest on
the specie so withdrawn; and he feared the serious opposi-
tion of the financial world, particularly of Germany, which
was at that time abandoning silver for gold monometallism.
1. D. R. Dewey, Financial History of the U. S. pp. 372-373.
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When Hayes became president, March, 1877 John Sherman of
Ohio was appointed secretary of the treasury. He had held
an important part in framing the resumption "act, and im-
mediately upon taking office undertook ..icre decided meas-
ures to carry it out. Sherman almost solely relied upon
building up a gold reserve through the sale of bonds for
coin. From Congress he realized that he would get no added
support: rather there was danger that he v/ou 1 d. he prevented
from doing anything at ali, for in 1877 the inflationists
were in. control of "both Houses of Congress, and again made
I determined effort to repeal the resumption act. Such a
measure was passed by the House of Representatives and fail-
ed in the Senate only through disagreement on details.
When, it became necessary to resume specie payments by
the coinage of metallic money, the Treasury Department de-
cided to revise and codify the coinage laws. In t e course
of the codification, demonetization of the standard silver
dollar, already accomplished in fact, in 1834, and confirmed
in 1853, was legally recognized. The act of February 12,
1873. "revising and amending the laws relative to the mint,
assay offices, and coinage of the United States," provided
for certain coins, among Which the standard dollar was not
included, and then in a subsequent section provided: "That
no coins, either of gold, silver, or m^no'0 coinage, shall
hereafter be issued from the mint other than those of the
denominations, standards, and weights set forth." Such
silver dollars as wer« in existence, however, still retain-
ed their full legal -tender quality until the enactment of
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the Revised Statues in June, 1874, which contained the
following provision:
-
Section 3586. "The silver coins of the United States
shall be legal -tender at their nominal value for any
amount not exceeding five dollars in ?ny one payment."
It was this legislation o^ 1875 and 1874. in its rela-
tion to sub sequent events which led to the charge that the
silver dollar had been surreptitiously demonetized and that
this action by Congress constituted the "Crime c r 1873."
It was after the fall in tie gold value of sliver had
changed seriously the relations between the two metals that
agitation began for the remonetization of the silver dollar
of 412* grains at the ratio of 16 to 1 which had been fixed
by the act of 1834, and for tie free coinage of this dollar
on private account with full legal-tender power. It wss
then that the advocates of this policy expressed surprise
that the si Ivor dollar v ad been discontinued by the act of
1873 and that the more hot-headed among them attributed
this action to conspiracy on the p^rt of the advocates of
the gold standard. It was emphatically declared by the
gold rren that the free coinage of silver imder existinr
conditions would arive gold from circulation, injure the
public credit, and result in a. dishonest readjustment of
debts which had been incurred under the gold standard.
Notwithstanding these protestations, the economic condi-
tion of the country and the scarcity of money were such
that the House of Hepre sent-^ti ves , in the autumn of 1877
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passed a bill, reported by Hepresents tive Bland of Missouri.,
for opening the mints to the free coinage of the silver dollar.
The monetary system was also threatened v/ith the free
coinage of silver.- Surrounded by embarrassments it. was
inevitable that Sherman should find difficulties in selling
bonds: European financiers, alarired by the greenback and
coinage agitations, (movements to be subsequently described)
expected American finances to be deranged, and returned a
considerable block of bonds which competed v/ith the new
issued. ^n spite of fitll obst^c"!es, Sherman persisted in
the policy of gold accumulation. He concluded that 40 per
cent of the nrtes was t ; e smallest safe reserve of gold:
on this basis $138,000,000 in coin was necessary. On Jan-
uary 1, 1879, the treasury had gathered together c 133 ,000,000
of coin over and above all matured liabilities. To do this
195,000,000 of bonds were sold, the balance being met from
the surplus revenue. Slowly but gradually the value of the
notes approached parity with gold, and on December l r;
,
1878^
a fortnight before the date set, paper currency was ru oted
at par. In the actual carrying out of resumption, it is to
be observed that there was no contraction whatever in the
paper currency. No destruction of treasury notes took place,
very little paper money was presented for gold, and whatever
came in was paid out ag»in by the treasury for immediate use.
^nder the original resumption act of 1875. authority was
given for the cancellation of ^82,000,000 legal-tender
(dependent upon issue of new bank-notes) which would have
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reduced the total volume to • ;300,000,000. Some contend-
ed that under the resumption act of 1875 there could be
no reissue of the green-backs when once received into the
treasury. The inflationist successes of 1877-78 settled
this uncertainty once for all, since Congress, May 31,
1878 ordered that there be no further destruction of green-
backs. This amount then outstanding was >o46 ,681 ,000, a
slight reduction from the $382,000,000 outstanding in Jan-
uary, 1875. It was also enacted in 1878 that all notes
When received should be paid out again thereby keeping
them in circulation. Any donbt as to the constitutional
right to do this was removed by the Supreme Court. The
burden of redemption in gold was thus made perpetual, al-
though no automatic process was devi sed, which wou~i d pro-
mise an ever-ready stock of gold for exchange. Fortunately
on account of the commercial prosperity which was reflected
in large treasury surpluses, the burden of keeping up the
gold reserve was lightly felt during the next ten years.
Then, however, a new supply of treasury notes was «dded by
the act of 1890, without any added provision for the gold
reserve, and revenues showed a deficit instead of a sur-
plus, the weakness cf the arrangement was disclosed.
During the Revolutionary period metallic money and
paper money remained in the confusion of the colonial per-
iod. Ever?/ foreign coin of the same intrinsic worth was
given an unequal value in the different parte of the Union.
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The various units of account employed in different parts
of the country tended to obscure a clesr understanding
of the economic situation of the several states. Because
the United States did not officially adopt the gold stand-
ard until 1900 her economic development was considerably
retarded. It is true that we have had the gold standard
from 1834 up to the oresent time, but since it never was
declared official until 1900, our growth during the period
from 1834 to 1900 was slow. Panics and depressions were
the expected things. In 183*7 we had a severe panic due
to our poor money s"stem. In 1861 the gold standard was
temporarily abandoned and paper money was Issued in its
place. The issuance of this paper money caused inflation.
The result of the inflation on economic condtions was
once apparent. Money began to lose its value and economic
activity was almost brought to a standstill. ^Hiring the
Civil War considerable gold speculation took place. This
gold speculation v/as another factor hurting our economic
development since there v/as considerable illegal manipu-
lation for private interests, '''he discovery of gold in
California was another item of importance in adding to
our gold holdings. '.Vhenthis new discovery of gold was
added to the amount of money already in circulation, we
had temporary inflation again. But, as this gold was real
roney, the effect was not as bad as though the country was
inflated vlth paper money. In 1873 we had another panic due
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8gain to our poor money S7fstem. faring this panic,
people actually went back to bartering. Gold was driven
from circulation, public credit war injured, and there
was a dishonest readjustment of the debts which had been
incurred under the gold standard.
*
In the United States, the struggle by which the gold
standard was finally established by law beyond cavil was
made especially acute by the neglect of Congress to pro-
vide a proper s stem for the issuing of credit in the less
developed parts of the countr^, and by ^lind groping^ in
search of a remedy for the industrial depression of 1893.
After the country had declared unequivocally for the gold
standard in the presidential election of 1896, a ccn perence
wps called by the Board of Trade of Indianapolis, on the
initiative of Mr. Hugh H. Hanna of that city. This prelim-
inary gathering resulted in two large conventions of re-
presentative business men held in Indianapolis, in January
1897 and in January 1898, which demanded the enactment of
laws by Congress for> a "deliberately planned monetary system."
1
It was demanded that such a system should provide that the
present gold standard should be maintained and that steps
should he taken for the ultimate retirement of government
legal-tender notes. '"'hen Congress neglected to authorise
a commission to frame s^ch s measure, s comrission was named
by the executive committee of the convention, with ex- enatcr
1. Report of the Monetary Commission of the """ndianapoli s
Convention, p. 8
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George F. Edmunds, of Vermont at its he^d. and the Hon.
Gharlea S # Fairchild, ex-Secretary of the Treasury, among
its members .
The measure proposed by this commission was too com-
1
plete and far-reaching to find immediate acceptance. But
their report, as Hepburn declared, "was forceful, lucid,
and convincing, and had a great influence upon the public
mind." It served .at least to set up a standard toward
which practical legislation was directed, if it would not
absolutely attain it. To the patience, tact, foresight,
and self-sacrificing public spirit of Mr. ^anna, chairman
of the Executive '-'ormittee, was largely due the final frui-
tion of the movement in the Gold, standard Act of March 14,
1900.
The Gold Standprd Act of 1900 made the important de-
claration that the gold dollar- should be the "standard unit
of value, and that all forms of money issued or> coined by
the United States shall be maintained at a parity of value
with the standard and it shall be the duty of the Secretary
of the Treasury to maintain such parity." The means placed
at the command of the Secretary of the Treasury for the
purpose of keeping silver coins and the government notes at
par with gold were far beyond the authority conferred by
previous law. A definite gold reserve fund of vl50,000,000
was established, to be used exclusively for the redemption
of government legal-tender notes and this fund was directed
1. '-L'he Contest for Sound Mone y, p. 398
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to he kept unimpaired by the Secretary of the Treasury
by the issue, if necessary with United States gold bonds.
Government notes redeemed in gold were to be held in the
reserve fund until exchanged for gold.

Ill
THE W 0 R L D W A R AND INFLATION
1
The forces that pushed up the price level during
the period 1896 to 1913 were still operating when the
European war broke out. *key presumably would have con-
tinued to push up prices for some time had there been no
war, and they exerted an upward pressure on the price level
during the war itself. JJhile the world* s annual gold pro-
duction declined somewhat during the later periods of the
war, the amounts produced none the less continued to be
large, as compared with the average for any considerable
number of previous years, and they were being pured into
a reservoir of gold whose level had been for many years
a rising one. It is impossible to determine to what extent,
if any, some of the organic changes made in our1 banking system
during the last six years should be attributed to war causes.
important instance is the federal reserve amendment of
June 21, 1917 providing for a further reduction in legal
reserves of member banks and discounting entirely all cp sh-
in-vault legal reserve requirements for these banks. Impor-
tant reductions in legal reserve requirements were made by
our federal reserve legislation prior to the outbreack of the
war in Europe and with no reference to such a contingency,
ur banking system has been cumbersome and our use of reserves
exceedingly wasteful, ^he remedying of these evils through
the federal reserve system made possible and desirable the
1. H.R.Seager, Inflation and %gh Prices, (Proceedings of the
Academy of Political Science) Vol. 9 pp. 1-2
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release from reserves of large quantities of money with
corresponding reductions in reserve ratios. Under normal
conditions this release would have resulted in heavy net
exportations of gold.
In 1913 the most important item in our paper money
circulation was the gold certificate which was backed
dollar Tor dollar by gold and of which the circulation
amounted to almost exactly one billion dollars. The new
federal reserve note called for a legal minimum gold re-
serve of forty per cent. Even before our entrance into the
war, the federal reserve bank had adopted the policy of with-
holding gold certificates from c~: rculation and putting into
their places federal reserve notes due to the fact that the
federal reserve notes were being used for payroll purposes
as a result of the increased value of labor. This policy
strenghtened the gold position of the federal reserve banks
and put into circulation, a more elastic form of paper money.
This caused inflation since a form of paper money was sub-
stituted requiring a forty per cent reserve for one which had
required a one hundred per cent reserve. The federal re^e^ve
did not cause tv is inflation sinc^ their actions were necessita-
ted by the increased value of labor. A billion dollars of
gold certificates, if w 1 tV drawn from c ' r cui a t ' en ar.d used ^ s
a forty per cent reserve for federa"1 reserve notes, would per-
mit a net currency expansion of $1,500 millions. Under normal
conditions the effect of such a policy on prices would have
been small, for the policy would have forced gold out of the
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country and, thereby, the resulting inflation would have
been spread out rather thinly over the gid standard coun-
tries of the entire world. Prior to our own entrance ?s
a belligerent in the war, the largest flood of gold, that
had ever came to any country within the same length of time
in the world's history, came to us. The four months,
August to November, 1914, witnessed a net exportation of
gold of 85.7 millions, chiefly in response to Europe's de-
mands upon us for the liquidation of our floating indebted-
ness to her. For approximately, the period since Armistice
November 11, 1918 to March 10, 1920, we h* ve had a net ex-
portation of gold of 387 millions. Our stock of monetary
gold decreased :'rom $3,0'0 millions on November 1, 1918 to
$2,271 millions on March 1, 1920. The War causes of in-
flat ion- the increased supoly cf monetary gold in the United
States, the reduction in the legal reserve requirements of
member batiks in the federal reserve system, the slackening
or production all created vast potentialities of currency
and deposit credit expansion of which the country availed it-
self, largely to buy bonds which the government floated for
financing the war. Bond buyers usually did not curtail other
expenditures; they consumed goods as before, banks loaned as
before, but no more goods were thereby created,
1 '
"nder the pressure of the increased purchasing power,
in the forms of circulating bank deposits and federal reserve
1. The New Lamed History of the United States p. 5840
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notes thus thrown on the market to be used in competition
for the pre-existing supply of goods, the p n'ce level was
rapidly forced upward. Our h< avy net export^ t ion s of goods
to Europe during the war resulted in large quantities of
European securities. These securities in substantia] quan-
tities were hypothecated at our hanks and served as a "basis
for further currency and credit expansion. It was some time
"before the potentialities for credit expansion which were
"being created in the manner ahove described made themselves
felt in the rising price level, There was no appreciable
increase in general prices from the outbreak of the wsr until
the fall of 1916. From that time until the Armst^ce the gen-
eral tendency of the pr _* ce level was strongly upward. There
was a slight reaction at the time of the Armst^'ce, but since
February, 1919. the upward movement has been agpin pronounced
and is continuing to this day.
In 1920, the price level, as measured by the Bureau of
Labor Statistics J-^dex Numbers, w^s approximately 150 per
cent higher than it was in July, 1914, or In the fall of 1915.
There is always a lag between the time of currency and credit
expansion and the rise in price level a lag which is largely
responsible for the scarcity of goods of nearly every kind
1
at current prices. We won our independence nearly a. century
and a half ago in a war financed predominantly by paper, money
inflation, we maintained the Union a. half a century ago by a
1. E.W.Kemmerer , Causes and Progress of lnflat ior . (Proceedings
of the Academy of Political ~c ; ence) -Tune, 1920.
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war financed extensively by paper money inflation, we
have Just preserved our political heritage by a war
financed in the United States largely by a deposit
currency inflation.
Among the arguments which have been offered apainst
the employment of loans and bank credit in financing the
war has been the contention that such a policy, leading to
an expansion of bank credit, would force up prices an ar-
gument commonly cast in the mould of the quantity theory,
though not necessarily involving quantity theory reasoning.
To the astonishment of most adherents of the quantity theory
the period since the great expansion of bank credit growing
out of liberty loans, has not been the period of rapidly
rising prices. Commodity prices had their great rise be-
tween December, 1916, and June, 1917,. since when, the average
of commodity prices has been fairly stable in the United
States. Prom June, 1917, to the middle of 1918, stock and
bond prices have had on the whole a steadily downward course.
1
Those writers who see nothing but inflation in expanding
bank credit during periods of stress, emergency, and rapid
transition, fail wholly to take into account the essential
function of bank credit. Bank credit expands when transi-
tions are to be accomplished. An enormous volume of new
bank credit has been required to finance the shifting of
industry from peace occupations to war occupations, to fin-
ance the huge receipts and disbursements of the Treasury, to ease
1. B.H. Anderson, Effects of the Wax on Money, Credit, and
Banking in France and the U.S. pp. 184-185.
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the tension of tax payments, to enable "business men to
liquidate slow assets while changing the character of
their production andmeeting the burden of taxes end loans.
Expansion of bank credit is necessitated by the hoarding
of deposits by business men who feel the necessity of
keeping an unusually liquid position in times of stress
and uncertainty. It is hard to understand what the in-
flationist theory would have banVs do in a gre« b emergency.
It certain that if banks refused to expand their credit 53
in times of stress, we should have demoralization «nd chaos.
There is a school of economists who have seen the whole
cause of rising prices in the policy of the governments
in borrowing instead of taxing, and in the policy of the
banks in lending to the governments or to the holders of
government war securities. This process is called in-
flation, and to the writers of this school, the terms
"rising prices," and "depreciation of money," have been
synonymous and the fundamental causation has been sought
in monetary banking phenomena.
It seems perfectly clear thai the fundamental causa-
tion involved lies in the field of production and consump-
tion and in the fields of public policy and social psychology,
and that, «t least so far as the United States is concerned,
the phenomena, of money and banking h^ve ^een largely second-
ary and derived, adjusting themselves to, rather than caus-
ing the more fundamental factors. The fundamental explana-
tion lies on the surface. Fifty to sixty million men, an
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enormous proportion of the labor force of the civilized
world, had been taken out of industry and put to work in
the most destructive kind of consumption of the products
of industry. Another and larger number of men have been
divested from tine production of goods for ordinary civi-
lian consumption to the production of munitions an d army
supplies, etc. In the^e facts we find sn adequate ex-
planation of the ri se in commodity prices without ascrib-
ing it to the stupidity of tj e fiscal policy of the Treasury,
without assigning it to the stupidity of the banks and with-
out attributing it to the monetary depreciation.
Before one can assert that there ha s been a general
rise in prices, one must take into account not only the
commodity prices, but also the prices of stocks and bonds,
1
real estate and other long time income bonds. Und^r
ordinary conditions, a marked rise in commodity rrices may
be taken as an index of a fall in the value of money. In
the midst of these changes, gold has remained •"'airly stable.
Prices changes in different parts of the wo^ld seem
to have had no close connection with the actual movements
o*' gold. Gold came to tN* United States "nd 'rices ^ose
in the United State?, but gold left England and France, and
prices rose in those countries even more. The effort to
work out any definite correlation between gold and. prices
on the basis of "normal laws 1 ' in abnormal tim^s appears
to be futile.
1. B.M.Anderson, Effects of the War on Money, Credit and
Banking in Fr8nce and the U.S. p. 204
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Summarizing t> e evi dence as to inflation during the
period 1913 to 1919 we find that for those six years the
physical volume of business increased approximately 9.6 per
cent, the monetary circulation 71 per cert and bank dono^its
120 por cent. The percentage of b etfaal cash reserve held
against deposits meanwhile declined from an average of 11.7
in 1913 to 6.6 in 1919. '^'he^e was contemporaneously a large
decline in the ratio of gold to the country's total cash and
to its total supply of exchange media.
In 1919, the gold standard was generally accepted and
was supposed to he in force. This was not true, for in Europe
gold had been abandoned through dire necessity, and the count-
ries 6f Europe had to mortgage not merely one hundred and twenty
days ,but many years for* future production. Gold a s a world-
wide medium of exchange had ceased to function. Gold continued
however to be the "common denominator," the standard while the
gold, price of currency was driven down. At the same time, the
production of goods fell off, lowering the credit total; and de-
mand for goods increased violently, raising ^^ices in terms of
gold. Of course, a huge volume of cheap credit franca °nd
credit pounds appe red. Ho" 7 then, did the United States avoid
a panic in 1920? Demand fell off, liouidation went ahead , all
2
of the symptons of the panic were there, but no panic. Because
blindly berhaps, we have set an automatic meter upon our credit
dollar which keeps it at a steady price measure in gold.
1. E .K .Kemmerer
,
High Prices and Deflation, p 29
2. Outlook, December 13, 1922, pp. 681-683 KC.Mcintosh

IV
AMERICA'S P OST WAR FINANCIAL
S U P R E 1 A C Y
1
The end of tie war found the credit systems of the
European notions undermined. America, because of her strong
economic position, became a creditor nation not only-
supplying materials, but a"1 so food to the starving people;
New York became the financial center and the American dollar
the arbiter of world exchange. For example: I>uring the ye^r
1910 the exports of the ^nited States to Europe amounted to
over $5,187,000,000 while the off-setting imports were sbru t
^750,000,000. The inevitable results of this coupled with
enormous loans to some cf the European governments as a re-
sult of the war, wa r a severe depreciation in forei"n ex-
change measured with the American dollar. Britain's pound
sterling, normally worth $4,8665 fell in January, 1920 to
the unprecedented lrw record of $3.19; German ma -ks normally
worth about 25.8 cents, fell as low as 1.05 certs while '"•'-ench
francs, normally worth about 5.18- per n?1.00 suffered a sym-
pathetic decline to the record of 13.38 and 14 per dollar.
At the forty-eighlh annual convention of t^e American
Bankers' Association meeting in New York City, October 2-6,
1922, the British banker, Mr. Reginald McIv enna. , asked his
American colleagues "to treat England's debt to the United
States as certain to be provided for." His conclusions, pre-
senting a comprehensive view of the financial status of the
1, J. Kavana.ugh, Bank Credit Methods and Practice
,
pp. 21 -22
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world today and summarized by the New York World ore
1
reprinted by the literary Digest: "First, tjhfi t Eng-
land can pay interest and sinking fund, because she
still possesses foreign securities with which to pay.
Second, that the other debtor countries, including
France and Italy, do not have foreign securities with
which to pay their debts. ^hey could pay only by export-
ing more goods than they import; and since the world is
not prepared to take a great surplus of French and Italian
exports, hope of payment from these countries must be de-
finitely postponed, and nothing expected ultimately, except
what can be paid, by the export of goods. Third, that
Germany can pa 77- now only with foreign balances which she
still possesses. But these balances could only be used, for
reparations if individual Germans would sell them to their
government. This consent can only be ohtained by offering
them at a profit, which in turn can only be done by improving
themark.
"
1. Allied Debt as a Peace Club (Literary Digest 0. 21,
1922, p. 13

VW H Y GOLD COMES HERE
Some officials in Washington, according to the anony-
mously inspired dispatch of ilic"hr>rd V. Oulahpn to the New
York imes, are becoming restive undor the criticism nf the
Administration for the unparalleled concentration of gold
in this country. It is not their fault, they ssj. x'here
is no hoarding of gold in the United °tates. 'J-'he gold is
coming here because of the flight of capital from other
countries, where confidence in governments, banking systems,
i
and currencies has been shaken. The gold has come here be-
cause it is seeking a "refuge." That, apparently is all
there is to it. Indeed, Mr. Oulahan 1 s dispatch goes so far
as to say: "it is held in informed quarters here that those
disposed, to set up tV e accusation of hoarding should under-
stand that neither the government nor its citizens had any-
thing to do with the flow of gel d from abroad."
This is an amazing statement, but there is at least
one element of truth in it. An important school of British
economists, including such distinguished members as Sir
Josiah Stamp and Maynard Keynes^ ha s contended that our
Federal 1 eserve Board has deliberately been pursuing a policy
of hoarding and sterlizing the gold. There does not appear
to be any convincing evidence for this contention. On the
1. Why Gold Gomes Herei ^he Nation, September 23, 1923. p. 297
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contrary, the Federal Reserve Boar] and the individual re-
serve "hanks appear since the war to have been pu r-sui 1- g every
possible policy that would tend to drive gold out, rather
than dr»w it into tie country. Contrary eve~ to what is
generally considered sound central banking policy, they have
kept their discount rates ^elow open market rates, and they
have forced down open market rates themselves by their
policy of buying bills extensively in the open market. With
money rates low in this market, the tendency would have been
other things equal, for international balances which ulti-
mately mean gold to flow to the markets of otv er countries
where they could command higher rates. Our artificially
low rates, however, while apparently ineffective in keeping
gold from flowing here, were highly effective in a way not at
first intended, for the:r encouraged and sf 1 mu"1 ~n t ed the most
extravagant orgy of stock speculation in our history, and the
timidity, and even political pressure that keot those
rates from being promptly raised when stock speculation got
out of hand finally led to the subsequent di.c astrou^ coll^nse.
The unnamed Administration officials at T"-sh.ington would. !
be in the main correct, therefore, if they contended, that
our i-mense gold holdings had not come here as the result of
American banking policy. When they go on to assert, however,
that neither the Government, nor its citizens, had anything
to do with the flow of gold from abroad, they are talking
1
nonsence. Two factors p^e principally responsible for bringing
1. The Nation:- Why Gold Comes Here, September 23, 1923. p 298
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gold here. The first is our preposterous tariff, which
amounts virtually to a frank: declaration on our part that
we do not want to be paid for our exports with our im-
ports. The other is our heavy, private, foreign invest-
ments, amounting to about |15 ,000 ,000,000 and the debt
of nearly |12 ,000,000 ,000 owed to us by foreign govern-
ments, the interest and principal of which, we demand
shall be paid.
Finally, it might be pointed out, that even the lack:
of confidence in foreign governments, is in large part the
result of our own political policy. T T ot until we proclaim
our readiness to cut the war debts are the Terman repara-
tions likely in turn to be reduced to a figure that might
facilitate trade stability.
It was the opinion of Oairnes, Jevons, levasseur, and
Soetbeer, eminent economists of the nineteenth century,
that the great output of gold, in the fifties and sixties
had caused an average increase to the prices of commodi-
ties, equal to about £0$. In some cases the increase was
greater than the average, in others less; and in still
others it counteracted a decline of price, which would or-
dinarily have taken place, by reason of new inventions and
improved processes of production.
The way in which new supplies of gold operate on prices
1
will now be considered. The essential quality of pold is
that it constitutes purchasing power. It is per se a demand
for goods. People do not mark: up prices of the thinp-s they
1. ^ncylope d ia Americana:- p. 59
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have for sale, merely because new gold m'nes have been
discovered, however, rich trey may be. Tf a portion of
the community (gold miners or others) should find $2.00 in
their pockets where they had been only : r>1.00 prices "'ould
not rise in consequence merely of that fact. Tradesmen
would ssif the same prices for their wares, laborers would
work for the same wages as before, buyers would expect to
receive the same Quantities of goods for a dollar, as be-
fore. But the possession of double the quantity of money
by the fortunate persons, would double their demands for
goods, and this increase of demand wou~> d. cause an advance
of prices. The attempt to supply the demand would call for
mo-'-e labor and cause an advance- of wages. Then the advance
of wacres would enable the wage-earners to improve t^eir
style of living by "buying more goods and there would be a
further advance in prices unless it should be counteracted by
new facilities of production and transportation. Such new
facilities wou^d almost ce^tn i nl • be called into existence.
In other words, industr-7- would be stimulated.
It was in this -ay that the new supplies of gold oper-
ated to cause the advance of both prices and w^ges in the
20 -ears succeeding the great gold, discoveries of California
and Australia. The community was not m^de richer by using
two dollars, instead of one, to transact a given amount of
business, but the distribution of the earnings of society was
shifted by giving an advantage, as Frof. Cairnes. showed at
the time, to wage earners over rentiers and others ^ving
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fixed incomes, '-''he former had steadier employment and
better wages, while the letter were obliged to pay higher
prices for consumable goods without any enlargement of
their income.
In the decade 1891-1900 the production of gold wa°
more than twice as great as that of the decade 1851-1860.
Why h* s not the same effect on prices been noticed as was
observed after the great output of California and Australia?
Tbere was some adva1 ce in prices during those last five years
which may be fairly attributed to those new supplies of gold.
The counteracting forces of new inventions and facilities of
production nnd transportation, and the bringing of new land
under cultivation, were very active and potent during that
time. Moreover, the amount of gold in existence in 1891,
upon which the new supplies empinged , were larger than the
amount of both gold and silver in 1850. Yet it was fa*rly
anticipated that we were on the eve of another period of ad-
vancing -prices, due to the great output of gold, mentioned
above
.

VI
THE VALUE 0 F GOLD AND T HE V ALUE
0 F MONEY
In a gold standard country, the quantity of money is
such, that its value, and that of a defined weight of gold,
are kept at an equality w] th one another. It looks, there-
fore, as if we could confidently take a step forward and
say that in such a country the quantity of money depends
upon the v/orld value of gold. Before tfr e war tMs would
have been a true enough statement, and it may come to he
true again, in the lifetime of those now living. It is worth
while therefore to consider what, if it he true, are its im-
plications.
1
The value of gold in its turn depends on t v e world's
demand for it, for all purposes, and on t) e quantity of it
in existence in the world. Gold Is demanded not only for
its use as money and in reserves, but for industrial qnd
decorative purposes, and to be hoarded by the nations of the
^ast;' and the fact th^t it csn he ta ven and absorbed into,
or ejected from these alternative uses, sets a limit to the
poss-'ble changes in its value, which may arise from a change
in the demand for it for monetary use^, or from a change in
its supply. But from the point of view of any single country,
the most important alternative u^e for gold, is its use s s
money, or reserves in other countries; and this becorr^s an
occasion for a very important matter. For it means, that a
1. D.H. Robertson:- Money pp. ^9
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gold standard country Is liable to be at the mercy of any
change in fashion, not merely in the methods of decoration
or dentistry of its neighbors, but in their methods of pay-'
ing their bills. For instance, the determination of Germany
to acouire a standard of gold, in the Seventies' materially
restricted the increase in the Quantity of money in England.
If we *»8se#$t,hat at the present day the quantity of
money in every gold standard country, and therefore its value,
depends on the world value of gold, we shall be in danger of
making a grave mistake. For the world's demand for gold
includes the demand of the particular country which we are
considering:- and if that country be very large and powerful
like the United States, the value of gold is not something
which she must take, as given and settled by forces outside
her control, but something which up to a point, at least, she
1
can effect at will. It is open to the United States to
maintain what is in effect an arbitary standard, and to make
the value of gold conform to the val-e of her money, instead
Of making tlr e value of her money conform to the value of gold.
And this she can do while still preserving intact the full
trappings of a gold circulation or gold bullion system.
Now for a number of yea>"s, for reasons connected partly
with the war and partly with 'ts own inherent strength, the
United States has been in a powerful position in regard to
1. D.H. Robertson:- Money pp.80
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its control over gold. More than one third of the world's
monetary gold is &I11 concentrated within her shores* and
she possesses two big elements of play in her system the
power of varying considerably in practice, the proportion
of gold reserves which the Federal Reserve Banks hold against
their notes and deposits and the power of substituting for
one another two kinds of common money: against one of which
the law requires a gold reserve of 100 per cent. It seems
as though the United States ho s been deliberately trying to
treat gold as servant, and not as a master.
1
It would be misleading to say that in America the value
of money Is being kept equal to the value of a defined weight
of gold? but it is true that tl e value of money and the value
of a defined weight of gold, a-^e being kept equal to one
another. We are net therefore forced into the inconvenient,
paradoxical statement, that America is not on a gold, standard.
Nevertheless it is arguable that a truer impression of the
world f s monetary affairs, would be given, by saying that
America, is on an arbitary standard, while the rest of the
world has climbed back painfully to a dollar standard.
2
One reason for the stability in value of the precious
metals over short periods, is that tbs mass of gold in exis-
tence at any one time is very large in proportion to the pro-
duct of any given year. he total amount of wheat, in exist-
1. Money, D.H.Robertson, pp.1
2. Carver, Principles of National Economy pp.368
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ence at the present moment, has practically all been pro-
duced within the last year, or two years at the outside.
Of the total gold in existence a very small fraction was
produced within the last year or two. °ince it would take
a number of years of erce r s production of gold to make an
appreciable difference in the total quantit7 r available for
the world's supply, gold does not fluctuate much from day to
day, from week to week or even from ye» p to year.
As most of the transactions in which we use money are
short-time rather than long-time transactions, it is more
important that the money material he stable over short per-
iods, than that it be stable in value over long periods. ™he
average business transaction has very little relation to long
periods of tirre. i his is one of the principle reasons why gold
serves the purpose of a money material, better than most other
pr octet ct s
.

VII
CREDIT A g D GOLD
It has been found convenient in discussing the prin-
ciples by which the value of money is determined, to pro-
ceed at first substantially on t be assumption th^t money
consists of gold, and that changes in the quantity of gold
in a. community react directly upon the prices of other
commodities than gold. "ith the introduction of other
forms of currency and also of credit which is not in the
form of currency, new factors are brought into tVe problems.
A mass of currency results, consisting of gold and paper
together, whose aggregate movements are influenced by
economic changes in much the same manner as the movement
of gold would be influenced, if it were the sole medium
of transactions; but by the instroduc tion of the new .factor
the direct relationship between gold and other commodities
is more or less modified and obscured. It remains true
under the most complicated forma of the modern credit sys-
tem that radical ch anges in the supply of gold will re^ct
finally ur^on the prices of sorr.e commodities, but the credit
system makes this reaction at once more complicated ^nd
less direct than if no such intermediary came between gold
and goods.
The form of credit ^Ahich is most di recti-/ sensitive
to cVanges in the quantity of gold is that which takes the
form of currency whether government notes, bank-notes,
or token coins. It was formerly supposed that the^e forms
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of credit falling within the popul^ definition of
"mr>ney" responded almost automatically to changes in the
volume of gold, beca-ise such forms of credit were pro-
tected by definite reserves of gold. Modern methods of
converting capital into negotiable credit have however,
been so multiplied ana are ?o interlaced one with the
other that great variations may occur in the quantity ex-
tended by banks and trust companies without corresponding
variations in the quantity of ©did held as reserves. This
fact imposes caution upon attempts to argue from changes
in the quantity of money to changes in prices or from
m
changes in the Quantity of money. Lhree propositions may
be laid down on this head *s modifying the tendency to-
wards an exact ratio between gold and prices.
First, that changes in the quantity of gold in a
community do not cause exactly corresponding changes in
the quantity of currency.
Second, that changes in the quantity of currency
do not cause exactly corresponding changes in the quantity
of other forms of credit.
Third, that changes in the quantity of currency
or of all forms of credit are not accompanied by exactly
corresponding changes in prices of commodities.
A variety of forms of credit have taken the place of
gold as a medium of exchange in commercial countries and
h^ve thereby greatly economized its use. With certain re-
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servations these forms of credit may be considered as com-
plete substitutes for gold. As such substitutes, they
change the relation which would exist between money and com-
modities if the entire work of exchange were imposed upon
1
gold. As Pantaleoni declares:
"The Ian of the value of instrument? of credit comes
to be, that every such instrument is worth as much as the
mone;/ for which It is substituted, and whose value it v as
reduced ^elow tie i evel it would attain, if no instruments
of credit were in circulation as a medium of exchange."
Ultimately the value of substitutes for gold depends
upon g'-ld. 'J-liey cannot retain a fixed value in gold unless
they are-exchangea bl e for it. Kence a definite relation h»s
been assured between substitutes for gold and the amount
of metal held in reserv-s. In most countries, however, even
an approach to a definite relationship of thr s sort exists
only between gold and those forms of credit which are used
as currenc;y. Other forms of credit, like deposits, checks,
bills or exchange, and clearings, operate to economize the
use of money without having any definite relationship, fix-
ed, either by law or custom, to the stock of gold. These
forms of credit, however, do not differ greatly from those
which circulate as currency. The-- are. in effect, promises
to pay gold on demand and it is the bj=- iness of-ba -kers to
see that the stock of gold does not become too a ttentua ted
in relation to such oromises. It is not the absence of such
1. Pure Economic
-pp. 240.
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relationship which it is sought to establish here, but
the extremely wide limits within which the volume of
gold on the one hand or of credit on the other hand mny
vary without producing any obvious influence on the other
1
factor. The absolute increase of demand for gold quantity
of deposits is so insignificant compared with the total
world's supply of gold, as to be disregarded.
Theoretically a definite relationship exists when,
as in the case of the national banks of the United States,
fixed reserves are required against deposits. The National
Banking Act prohibits any national bank from making a loan
or declaring a dividend after its reserve has fallen "below
the legal limit. In theory, therefore, an export of gold
derived from the reserves of the New York banks should Ve
followed by a contraction of four times the amount in de-
posits, but, practically, the relation cannot be established
mathematically, because the proportion of reserves is con-
stantly changing, is usually in excels of legal requirements
(although sometimes below it) and because deposits ar>e kept
by trust companies, State '"anks a^d other institutions
which are not governed by the s a re-reserve laws. Such in-
stitutions, in many cases, keep la-ge deposits with national
banks which maintain metallic reserves, and there results
from this system a duplication of the credit secured by
1. Laughlin:- Principles of Money, pp.128
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the reserves, which permits great elasticity in expand-
ing and contracting credit and makes it practically im-
possible to deduce any fixed mathematical relation be-
tween credits and gold.
When changes of prices accompany changes in the vol-
ume of credit, the former are more likely to be the cause
of the latter. This results inevitably from the fact that
credit instruments are often created by the exchange of
goods. A manufacturer who wishes to buy raw materials
makes applications to his bank for a loan. The loan might
be made to him by giving trm gold or by handing him bank-
notes. In t": e latter c^se, a demand for gold would not be
involved unless the bank had already leaned notes to the
1
maximum amount allowed ag^in^t its existing reserve. As
business increased credit money increased and if the effect
of increa^ng business is to raise prices, and thus to re -
ouire an additional quantity of media of exchange, a credit
increases in proportion and the additional media are at
once forthcoming. Thus the quantity of money in use at any
given time depends on business, and not business on money*
It is business which creates money, and not money which
creates business.
Not only may credit be greatly expanded without call-
ing for an increase in the ^tock of gold, but conversely,
there may be an increase in the stock of gold without a
1. Farrer:- Studies in Currency, p. 132.
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corresponding expansion of credit. When s quantity of
new gold enters a community already fairly well equipped
with a medium of exchange it is apt to find resting place
in reserve banks, whether it shall he soon expanded and
availed of as a basis for increasing loans depends upon
the condition of credit. If there is little demand for
increased credit, the new gold may lie ^or s long time in
reserves, and eventually he exported without any visible
effects in rising prices.
Prices are much more influenced by the state of in-
dustry and of credit than by the supply of precious metals.
If there has bean over-production of certain commodities
beyond, effective demand for them, a sudden influx of new
gold, will not restore equilibrium. At such time of depress-
ion there is usually more than enough gold in bank vaults
for current demands; and. the^e is still mo^e idle capital
in the fc r>m of banking credits awaiting investment, but
hesitating from lack of confidence to Accept the investment ,on
the market. The influence of the influx of new gold upon a
depressed market would be governed as much by the exact point
which had been reached in revival of confidence a s by the
quantity of new gold. If the collapse Of credit had just
taken place and the period of prostration had only begun,
the new gold would, have little influence in reviving activity,
because it could net restore the shattered equilibrium be-
tween effective demand, and supply of commodities. If,
however, the influx of new g&d came when the period of de-
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pression wss nearing its close, and industry were on
the eve of revival, the new gold, might add a factor to
the impulse of reviving activity. To this extent changes
in the Quantity of gold act upon prices in the manner set
1
forth by Andrew:
"While, then, there is a measure o^ elasticity in the
credit currency, so fcfra% in every cycle of trade .there are
fluctuations in the monetary supply that do not reflect
themselves in the amount of credit, nevertheless the quan-
tity of money held "by the banks ~ets*a limit beyond which
credit cannot be extended, and in the course of evry cycle
this limit is actually reached. In the long run, as apprt
from the cyclic oscillations, the quantity of banking credit
is governed by the quantity of money, and e^ch permanent
addition to the monetary supply tends in the end towards an
increase of credit."
In the United States the stock of gold money increased
by mor^e than 100 per cent from 1896 to 1905, and the total
stock of m ney increased by nearly fifty rer cent. Prices
of commodities advanced considerably during this period, but
in no such ratio as the increase in the ^antity of money.
Upon the whole the banks absor" ed considerably more than
their proportion of the new gold, but absorbed much more
from 189 17 to 1899 than during later years. Notwithstanding
the increase in the stock of money from year to -e^r>, the
1. Andrew:- Proceedings of the American ^con. ^ssoc. p. 114
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demand for Its use outside the banks r-as so gr-"t fls to
leave a decreasing proportion to be addod to bank reser-
ves. Tioans and deposits increased until 1903, when there
cane a fall of prices in securities and an arrest In the
upward movement of commodity prices.
At first it might seem that this result was a demon-
stration of the relation of prices to the stock of money.
The question at issue, however, is not whether the stock of
money kf 5 pt pace with the demand for it, but whether changes
in the supply of money were in themselves the causes of
changes in prices. It is undeniable that periods of industrial
activity increase the demand for standard goods and in most
cases the demand fo r< standard mcnej. "tit the variations in
the v:rices of goods do not follow with any "regularity the
variations in the stock of standard money, because elasticity
is giv^n to the monetary system by the use of the various forms
of credit. The employmen t of credit in a lar>ge proportion
to metallic r :oney may be compared to the stretching of s
rubber band; periods of diminished credit to the relaxation
of the band, ''•'he length to which the band is stretched will
afford no definite indication of the amount of rubber which
it contains. EVen if it were admitted in theory that appar-
ent changes in the value of money over ten year periods were
due to variations ir credit, whil^5 the changes over longer
periods were due to changes in the quantity of standard mon-
ey, it wou^d remain true that no safe rule could be framed
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for separating the one source of variations from the other
and thereby determining by prices the real variations in
the value of standard money due to chanres in its quantity.
One of the most important of the influences which
counteract the e ffect of changes in the quantity of gold
is the state of credit. If an increase or decrease of the
gold stock is to produce a direct and visible effect, the
state of credit must be constant. The ssrr e willingness to
loan mu p t prevail at all times, the same degree of con-
fidence must exist among the bankers, the same rate of dis-
count must be open to borrowers (else the number of borrow-
ers will be diminished); the demand for capital must be
unchanging, and the entire movement of bank credits and
clearings unchanged, except as it is affected by the in-
creased supply of metallic money. Such conditions are
never realized. If such absolutely static conditions
arose in New York, seme incident in Berlin or London or
Paris would disturb them by increasing the r^ te offered
for gold in those places and so changing the relations of
the money market of New York to that of other parts of the
world
.
One ofthe factors which demonstrate th p t the price of
commodities is not determined ^y the supply of metallic
money at a given moment is the movement of money back and
forth etween the stock exchanges and the money markets
under the influence cf changes in discount rates. An acute
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demand for credit, due in part to undue extension of
credit in relation to gold, is often tnet by the sale of
bills of exchange upon foreign banking houses.
The movement of money under the operation of the
charge for its rental technically called the "discount
rate" is often independent of any direct and obvious variation
in its exchange value in commodities. Changes in t v e discount
rate attract money for the special purposes f o 1 wb"1' cv it is
needed by brokers and hankers, who have contracts to deliver
money which they may be called upon to fullfil. It is
only when the der.and for money is the symptcn of deeper
economic disturbances in the misapplication or increased
demand for circulating capital that changes in the discount
rate are followed by changes in the value of money as measured
in commodities. The two influences often accompany one
another, but they are not inseparable. The rate of in-
terest is the measure of capital rental, and it may happen
that an increase in the supply of money is not accompanied
by high prices nor low interest rates.
The rate of interest was sufficiently hr" gh in the period
from 1850 to 1860 when money became ^o abundant hy the in-
flux of the gold of California ard Australia; it w»s, on the
contrary, very low in Western Europe during the period 1882
to 1892 although the production of gold, the only actually
effective money of the rich nations of Europe, was consider-
ably restricted.
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In regard to temporary fluctuations in the exchange
value of money, it is clear that they are not controlled
by the r^tio of the quantity of money to the quantity of
goods. Tbere may be a great rise in the value of m^n ey
without any corresponding redaction of the quantity, and
there may he a great fall in its value without an?/- corres-
ponding increase in its quantity. Its value must he meas-
ured by the prices of one commodity or several, or by the
representatives of such commodities. Taking securities as
such a basis for the value of money, the six months of the
spring and summer of 1903 witnessed an average decline of
perhaps forty per cent in the price of securities ouoted
on the New York Stock Exchange. If these titles to pro-
perty were the gauge of the quantity of m^ney in the United
States, then the amount mu?t have decreased by forty per
cent within the brief space of six months. In fsefc., neither
the mass of rold in fche world, representing about five
thousand millions of dollars, nor the stock of gold in the
United States, amounting to about twelve hundred millions,
nor the total currency supply of trie United States suffered
material changes during this period. The total circulation
rose from £2,374,353,720 at the end of Aifcuil to $2, *27 ,394, 868
at the end of October and the per capita circulation in-
creased from : '29.08 to .29.99.
The chang® in the purchasing power of money which
occurred, under these c ' rcums tances -ere due to changes in
the condition of credit and the demand for capital. With the
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decline in the quantity of available credit, due to absorp-
tion of floating capital in new enterprises, the demand for
money became more acute than the demand for securities and,
without any decline in its quantity, its purchasing power
over securities was increased. Such instances go far to
demonstrate that changes in the conditions of credit are
so wide, and frequent as to deprive of value the compari-
son of prices in order to reveal the effects of changes in
the quantity of money. It may be true theoretically, and
probably is, that other things being equal, a change in the
quantity of money would cause a change in the relation of
money to certain commodities. If, however, the changes over
a short term of years caused by a large increase or decrease
in the stock of money are confused by the more frequent and
extreme changes caused by other influences, then it becomes
extremely difficult, if not impossible, to isolate the resi-
dium of the change in the relations of money to prices caused
by changes in the quantity of money in existence.
The temporary changes in the ratio of money to goods
would, moreover, be found upon almost any reasonable hy-
pothesis to be much more important than the permanent changes.
Let it be supposed, for illustration, that within a period
of fifty years there was an increase of 130 per cent in the
ratio of the quantity of money to be used to the quantity
of transactions in which it was employed. The average in-
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crease in the quantity oT money then would be two per cent
a year. While a permanent gain or loss of this amount would
be a factor of pome importance, it is nothing li e as gr^t
a factor as an advance or fall of prices due to changes in
the condition of credit and the relation of production of
goods tc demand for them. These changes often reach twenty
five per cent in five ye c r°, or five per cent a yresr. They
would, represent, therefore, in the case supposed, an influence
more than twice as important as the influence of the gradual
increase or decrease of the stock ofmetallic money. It is
interesting to consider how these influences would interact
upon one another if they were felt in the opposite directions.
Let it be supposed that with the gold supply steadily increas-
ing at the rate of two p^r cent a ye^r, there was a collapse
of credit amounting to five per cent a ye^r for five years.
1
The result may be set forth in the following table:
-
Rise of prices Fall of prices Net fall
by depreciption of by impaired in prices
gold credit (per cent)
year (pp>r cent) (per cent)
1890 - 2 5 3
1891 4 10 6
1 892 6 15 9
1893 8 20 12
1894 10 25 15
Thus it would appear that with a steady increase of the
gold stock at the rate of two per cent per "year, a decline
1. Conant : - Principles of Money and Banking, p. 195
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of prices to the amount of fi r'teen per cert in five years
mif-ht emerge. On the other hind, if the gold stock wns
decreasing at the same rate, and credit expanding, we
should have just the opposite 'esult a net increase in
prices of fifteen per cert. If both influences operated
in the same direction, there might be a rise of prices
by thirty-five per cent or a aecline of thirty-five per
cent
.
In presenting the table it has been necessary7- to assume
a definite foreknowledge of the effect of tv/o conflicting
influences. But it is iust this assumption which is the
thing sought to be proved by tables dealing with the rela-
tion of currency to prices of commodities. The method
usually employed is that o^ averaging rrices over long
periods, upon the theory that the rise of prices due' to ex-
panding credit will be in the same proportion in one period
as another. It is oovlous1
,
however, that this is an assump-
tion for which evidence is lacking. A number o^ influences,
like the opening of new markets, the disturbance caused by
war and rumors of wars, the difference in the character
of speculation at different periods, charges in the economy
of money (like the creation of stock-exchange clearing-
houses) the different rates of earnings for capital under
varying conditions of its supply all enter into the prob-
lems, and make it clear that the ratio of expansion due
to credit conditions in one period is not evidence of the
ratio of a expansion due to such conditions at some other
period. • So powerful is the influence of change in condtions
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of credit in modifying the quantitative relations be-
tween gold and goods eg to abundantly justify the cau-
tion given by Keynes in regard tr tv e quantity low of
1
money:
"This is, in a sense, a hypothetical l*w: it does
not enable us to say that whenever there is an actual
increase in the quantity of money in circulation there
will be actually a rise in prices; nor does it even enable
us to say that if we find an increase in the amount of money
in circulation taking place concurrently with a general rise
in prices, the latter phenomenon must of necessity be wholly
due to the former. For the cause in question is not the
only one capable of affecting general prices. Its effects
may, therefore, be counteracted by the concurrent operation
of more powerful causes acting in the opposite di^ec^ion,
or exaggerated by the concurrent ope^tim of causes acting
in the satne &i reetion. 8
1. Keynes:- scope and Method of Political Economy, p. 216.

VIII
THE RELATION OP MONEY t' OP RICES
It has been seen^that the quantity of money ia one of
the influences affecting its value, but that it is only one
of the many influences acting upon the relations of money and
other things. We have seen that even if credit were not a
factor in modern monetary operations, the effect of changes
in the quantity of money would he first felt upon certain
goods rather than uniformity upon all goods. We have seen
also that the relation of the quantity of money to the
quantity of goods ia still further complicated by radical
and frequent changes in conditions of credit, which are
usually more potent over short periods than the changes
whicl- could he produced by changes in the quantity of gold.
'With these qualifications of the quantity theory of money
firmly fixed in the mind, it becomes possible to deal with
moderation with the history of prices, and to admit the
influence which may have been exerted over long periods
of time by changes in the ratio of the quantity of gold to
the quantity of goods and of transactions.
1
une of the reasons wh- changes in the quantity of
gold or of other legal -tender money are felt in only a small
measure over limited periods of time is the small ratio
which the production of gold in a single year o">° in several
years bears to the existing stock. If money were a perishable
article, so that the whole supply was the product of a single
1. Conant : - Principle s of Money and Banking, Vol. 2, p. 199
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year, then it would be subject to the snme violent fluctu-
ations in relation to other things which migrt be true of
whe°t, potatoes, or oranges, whose product varies greatly
from year to year. It has already been seen that a con-
siderable portion of t'1 e annual production is absorbed,
other things being equal by increasing demands for gold
for the arts, for replaclrg wear and tear in the money stock,
and for increase in volume of business.
This last demand would not be in a definite mathemati-
cal ratio to increase of business, but upon the whole, a
large increase in the number of transactions over a series
of years would demand an increasing quantity of gold. Wit 1"
t! ese elements given due weight, it is evident that an in-
crease of three per cent a yew in the gold stock of the
world would be far from implying that tl e ratio of gold to
goods had increased in a corresponding proportion. This
could only be true in case the annual production of other
things remained stationary in volume, while that of gold
advanced. Both gold, and ot er goods are subject to fluctua-
tions in volume of production. 'he amount of goods pro-
duced may in some years more than Veep pace with the in-
crease in the production of gold and in other years may fall
far behind, but upon the average of a series of years dur-
ing the modern industrial era production both of goods and
of gold has increased.
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It is obvious, therefore, that an increase of three
per cent in the stock of gold is not a fact which in itself
carries that demonstration of an increase in the ratio of
gold to other things. Even if such an increase were con-
ceded, we have seen that the principles governing the value
and distribution of money are -uch that the change would
not in any case be uniformly distributed, that the new gold
would probably not enter at once into use as money, and t"^at
the influence of its inc^e^sed quantity would, he involved with
and counteracted bv manifold other influences acting nnon
1
prices. The slowness with which any alteration in the pro-
ductiveness of the mines shows itself is strikingly proved by
the fact, that the civil disturbances have rendered the
Mexican mines almost totally unproductive for tte last fif-
teen years, so much so indeed, that silver has been sent to
Mexico from Europe, and yet neither the general value of
silver nor its specific value in gold, has suffered any
perceptible alteration.
The important movements in prices which have been
commonly ascribed to changes in the quantity of gold and
silver money r ave been the advances in prices which occurred
in the sixteentV and seventh eenth centnrie-, after the dis-
covery of tl e treasures of Mexico and Peru: the advance in
price's which occurred after 1860 when the mines of Califor-
nia were pouring the^'r treasures into the money market* and
the check in this advance, which occurred after 18^3 and was
attributed by the opponents of the gold standard to the scarcity
Senior,
Value of Money, p. "73
1
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of gold and the abandonment of silver ss their standard of
value
.
The system of index numbers, so -called for comparing
changes in prices, was adopted by 'evons in order tr reduce
to a common b^sis of comparison prices for widely variant
units of different commodities. The method adopted was to
take the monthly prices of certain articles, reduce the month-
ly prices for e^ch for the year to an annual average, and re-
duce the differences shown between prices fo^ different years
to a decimal scale, determined by assuming the average price
for a .^i ven ye-r or series of years to represent 100. Thus,
if whe«t sold in 1850 at |l.£0 per bushel and in 1865 at
$1.50 the index mr "hers obtained, if oricep in 1860 were
treated ?s the baseline, would be 100 to 1860 and 125 for 1865.
This method of treating prices enabled -i'evonp to claim th^t v e
h^d reduced prices of d.i ffere^t articles, based upon different
units of value, to a common basis of comparison, upon t 1_ e
ground that ratios "are things of the same kind, but of differ-
1
ent amounts, between which we can tako f=n averse." This
conclusion is debatable and is ?ub1ect to many oitfalls in
2
practice. We are considering relations, and Jevons draws
an average between relations, neglecting meantime the objects
related, and then he applies the result to the objects.
Jevons recongnized the criticism which would be directed
against taking the prices of a single year that they would
be materially influenced by fluctuations in conditions of cred-
1. Investigations in Currency, and Finance, p. 25
2. Prices snd I dex Nurbers, in Journal o^ Political Economy
(March, 1900) Vol. 8, p. 187.

"T/rew **ff4"n*rer Yir'es * $'t</ sr<)»</<}/</ country, Z>i
The L>- S. Poye j,a/</ sr//s ?r etevT J*</<?//j7s ^f°°»c('/ ^y4ctiyjf^
L
An>n/il AW Prudvctitn *f fail i*the VlorlJ
M i* the VniTeJ Stttes ^Amer/c4 Srt>» fW To tWf
With /i-/e4Y Aniftl Avmjts -Prom /rscTo/^so, 1*4
I
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it, independently of changes in the quantity of gold.
He sought to eliminate this element o r disturbance by
taking as his baseline the average ] evel of orices for
the six ;rear~ 1845-1850, inclusive. Taking the combined
prices of three years as the equivalent of 100 he ^ed^ced
the price of the same articles to a corresponding basis for
each year and in this way -sought to ascertain the v*~r ! *tions
from ye°r to year in the average prices of a group of
thirty -nine articles, ranging frorr 89.6 in 1849 to 128.8
in 1857 ard backward again to 113.4 in 1862. Admitting the
possibility of difficulty due to changes in conditions of
1
credit, Jevons made the following argument. "Such a re-
vulsion of credit took place in 1857; but, although five
years have since elapsed, prices are far from having fallen
to their old level. In the last two years especially, the
dearth of cotton has caused a depression of tr^de of a formid-
able character, tfhe lov/est average range of prices since
1851 has indeed happened in the last year, 1862: hut orices
even then -tood thirteen per cent ahove the average 1 evel
of 1845-1850: and it is most highly improbable that r^'ces
will Ion? continue to fall"} yet ^"ices have continually stood
atJove the high point they reached in 1847. Examine the year-
ly average prices at any point of their fluctuation since
1852 and they stand above any point of their fluctuations
before thenwithin the scope of my tables, 'ibere is but one
way of accounting for such a fact, and that is by supposing
a very considerable permanert depreciation of gold."
1. Investigations in Currency and Finance, p. 48.
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One of the simnle^t tables which will illustrate
a system of index numbers is that of Sauerbeck which
takes average prices for the ten years 1867-77 a? 100.
*hirty seven different articles are used, but several
in differ nt grades, so that a total of fifty-six items
is included. The average index numbers obtained for ce^-
1
tain representative years are as follows*
SAUERBECK 1 8 INDEX NUMBERS
(Index numbers for 1867-77 equal 100)
Year *otal Food • Total Materials Grand total
1846 95 85 89
1850 75 78 77
1855 101 101 101
1860 98 100 99
1865 -- 91 108 101
1870 - 93 99 96
1873 107 114 111
1875 100 93 96
1879 90 78 83
1889 --- 94 84 88
1885 74 70 72
1887 70 67 68
1890 73 71 72
1895 -- 64 60 62
1898 68 61 64
1899 - 65 70 68
1900 69 80 75
1901 67 72 70
1902 67 71 69
"'"he grand total is not necessarily the average of the
two totals given, bedause these latter are only the average
of the prices of articles which are not the same in number
under both sub -heads, ^he lav est and highest figures ob-
tained for various years are given in order to show how con-
1. Conant:- Principles of Money and Banking, p. 205
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siderable are the variations of prices from year to year.
it is not obvi us why the ebb and flow of gold should
be rejected as the controlling influence in fixing the actual
prices of wheat in January and July and should be accepted
as fixing the intangible concept of the "average price."
The rejection of the influence of the gold stock in fixing
actual prices involves tie admission of a fact dangerous
to the entire theory of index numbers ad indicating the effect
of changes in the gold stock on goods—that the fluctuations
in actual prices which are caused by influences direct! y
affecting goods are much greater than those caused by changes
in the stock of gold.
Another insidious danger of the system of averages is
the averaging of statistics of prices without reference to
1
the volume of transactions at these prices. It would not
be a singular phenomenon if the low price should attract
an unusual sale. Still another source of error is giving
equal weight to different articles, one of which may be worth
much less in the budget of family or industrial consumption
than arot h er
.
2
Still another source of danger is the fact cited by
Kinley that "Consumption changes its character. 11 With the
exception of a few "H^cles included among t v e necessaries
of life there is almost nothing which do-rand may not change
very nmch between two dates of consumption.
1. Journal of Political Economy (March, 1900) VIII: p. 185
2. Kinley: -Princi pies of iVioney, p. 158
I
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Among the c ons idera t ions which counsel caution 'n
accepting inde? numbers and averages *s proving anything
definite in regard to gold, the following are a few:-
1. The f«ll in the labor cost of producing commodi-
ties through the increased efficiency of machinery.
2. The fall in the market price of products by rea-on
of the reduced cost of transportation.
3. '^he increase in the efficiency of labor shown by
the increase of wages measured in gold.
4. ,J-'he increase in the volume of goods exchanged be-
tween distant places as the result of the increase in the
product of labor and the increases in the facility of the dis-
tribution of this product.
5. ''he economies in the use of gold caused by more
prompt communication and the use of foreign credits within
a shorter time.
The many facts w ich have been cited are not in then-
selves a demonstration that the value of gold does not move
up and down in proportion to the quantity of goods exchanged
in the market places. xhey tend, however, to establish the
proposition that averages of prices obtained by index numbers
from a mass of commodities constantly shifting in quantity in
proportion to one another, in quality, and in relations of
supply and demand in one place and another, cannot afford a
mathematical index of the value of gold arising from changes
1
in the quantity of gold. It is apparent that the variation
in the purchasing power of money is a consequence, an effect,
1. Journal of Political Economy, (December, 1898) VIII, p. 75
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of obscure and complex causes. The total index number
gives us, then, the effect measured in money, of all the
technical, industrial processes and of all other causes
which have determined the changes in price of the enumerated
commodities. If the index number shows increase ill the
purchasing power of rmney, it is in effect a consequence of
these factors and the declne in the prices of commodities is
due to those varied and complex causes.
It is possible to argue that the rise of prices is due
to expansion of credit and that this rise of prices ir^ the
influence which attracts the amount of gold required for
carrying on transactions. 'i'hi s makes gold follow the varia-
tions of prices instead of causing t em. The manner in which
the change is Interpreted by the advocates of the quantity
theory in its crude form is diametrically opposite that the
quantity of gold determines the movement of prices, not that
prices determine the movement of gold. There is probably some
truth in both views under differing circumstances. As between
two different countries, the one where credit is expanding and
business is active will tend to draw to it -elf from the exist-
ing stock such an amount of gold *s is necessary for carrying
on its transactions. In the gold-using v^orld as a whrle
,
however^
change in the absolute auantit?/ of gold in existence will enter
into the many influences acting upon the a verage prices through-
out the world (if such a w rid average is conceivable) with a
tendency to raise those rices which are most sensitive if
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there is fi marked increase of gold and to depress them if
there is a marked decrease of gold. The problem ia so com-
plex that it is doubtful if any amount of research would per-
mit reducing it to e mathematical basis.
It is on the side of demand for gold that the greatest
variations occur in its relation to the value of goods. The
demand varies greatly with changes in conditions of credit.
I
In a period of expanding credit, the demand is not primarily
a demand for gold but for capital. Gold operates simply as
the safety-valve, which is designed to insure not only a
sufficient supply of the medium of exchange in daily tr^nac-
tions, but such a relation between prices of different commod-
ities as shall q t a certain point creek over-production.
It is when such over-pr eduction reaches t v e point that prices
of goods fall seriously that gold serves a useful purpose as
a Standard. It is in such cases i ore a standard of relative
values than of absolute values, because those articles which
have been over-produced, fail in price, not simply in reaction
to gold, but in relation to articles for which there is a great-
er demand. Gold is the one article which is always in demand
in all gold standard countries and which, therefore, acquires
a peculiar value When other articles become less exchangeable.
The manufacturer who is selling steel rails or cotton goods as
fast as he can produce them finds them as good as money.
1. C0nant:- Principle* of Money and Banking, p. 220.
«
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It is only when he finds that he cannot sell them at his
usual profit that they cease to be valuable in hi s hands
and he then turns to money as the one article whose value
is unquestioned and which is always exchangeable for whet he
needs. Hence come the gre^t fluctuations in the demand for
money, which are much rr.ore important in affecting its ex-
change value than the slight annual changes in the new supply.
From these considerations emerges the conclusion that
such mathematical relationship as exists between the quantity
of gold and prices, is in actual transactions so obscured by
other factors that it cannot be ascertained correctly or
revealed conclusively, by tables or prices of commodities,
"hen additions to the stock of metallic money are l^rge and
permanent they act finally, in some degree, upon prices}
but this action cannot be treasured by any rui e c- of mathema-
tics, and is often less potent than many other influences
which effect commodities. It has alre-dy been shown that
the elevation of prices cannot become uniform because the
first effects of expanding credit v- suiting from ?r increase
in bank reserves are felt upon those commodities whose prices
are most sensitive end thereby cause a readjustment of the re-
lations of demand and supply between rther commodities, of
which gold is onlv one. Ahe true law governing 11 e demand
1
for metallic money is well stated by Kinley:
"At any moment the value of the standard money is fixed
by the interplay of competition between buyers and sellers
1. Kinley: Money, p. 146.
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of gold; "but it la a competition to ^uy and sell, not
gold in general, but a definite amount, a definite supply.
1] e demand is not for an amount sufficient to settle all
exchanges, but sufficient only for the settlement of the
"balance of the exchanges. Now the same ' alance may re-
present very different total volumes of exchanges, at
different times, on the same price level. """hat is to
say, the demand for money for immediate payment may re-
main the game for very different volumes of business, or
it may be larger, or smaller, for the sans volume of
business at different times."

IX
THE GOLD STANDARD UNDER FIRE
The first part of this chapter is going to ^e concerned
with: (1) the effect o r ' gold payments by the bank of England
on America j and (2) the "earmarking" by Federal Reserve
Banks of $180,000,000 in gold in foreign account in less than
a week. Foreign central banks fearing a drain on their own
resources, had sold large amounts o^ commercial bills in the
New ^ork market end put the proceeds in the T ederal Reserve
System, not as an ordinary deposit, but as actual "earmar 1 ' ed.
"
gold which its owners could ship home at any time.
The easiest approach to an understanding tr these
confusing events is to regard gold as the means by which in-
ternational payments are made, and not as a pile of metal lying
in a bank which holders of the bank's circulating notes have
a right to demand and hoard if they fear that the bank's notes
may become no good. Gold no longer counts for much as money
circulating from hand to hand. Paper has taken its place.
I
It was the breakdown of international transactions,
largely di: e to panic, that caused the trouble in September,
1931. In normal time*, remittances of gold between, countries
are comparatively small, because (to state t^e matter in its
simplest form) they rep r,e°ent only the d~" ffere^ce in amount
between goods and services pure 1 ased abroad and the outgoing
and incomirg Items tend to balance one another. Exporters
of goods have money due them in foreign countries. The" draw
bills of exchange covering these amounts and sell the bills
1. Scribners:- Gold. Standard Under Fire, Nov. 1931, p. 54
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to Importers who have pa7/-inents to make in foreign countries
so th^t one transaction offsets the other. When the supply
of bills offered for sale is not sufficient to satisfy the
demand, resulting in a rise in the prices of those bills,
the central bank steps in and releases enough gold for ex-
port to make up for the deficit.
This is the procedure in normal times and the present
times are not normal. In addition to the ordinary balances
created by commercial transactions, foreign money h r s flov/ed
in enormous amounts to Berlin, London, New *ork and to other
centers for investment or merely as hank deposits in those
markets. The foreign owners of t v ese investments and de-
posits have recently deraandad their money hock, precisely as
a honk depositor does when he doubts the solvency of his
bank. A crisis In Vienna in Nay of 1931 produced far great-
er crisis in Berlin in June and July and the Berlin crisis
spreading to London resulted in t fc e resounding crash of
September 30, 1931 when the Bank of England confessed that
it did not have enough gold in its vaults tr meet the de-
mand, and could, therefore, pay in gold no longer.
So much for the mechanics of the situation. The
effects, present and future, are far more complex. Countries
dealing largely witv England selling and recieving payment
for their goods in sterling and financing their foreign
trade through their London banking connections are confront-
ed with the problems wether they will continue their trans-
actions on a sterling basis, in spite of t" e wild fluctuation
a
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of the rate, or whether they will seek to oo busiress in
some other1 currency/. T^e difficulty of making the shift
and tl" e probable loss involved explains the tendency of
various countries to adhere to the pitish mone^ unit.
1
When the discussion arises, however, of substituting
some other money for gold by a number of nations leaving
France and the United States glutted with enormous stocks
of "useless gold," it is til e to examine the idea carefully.
A great deal of the gold in T*ew York and Paris is owned by
foreigners. If the gold standard is abandoned by their
countries, will they make us a present of the metal? What
will the commercial nations use as "counters" or units of
value, in settling their accounts with one another? Even a
currency, like the r'tish, which is off the gold base is
still valued in terms of gold in the foreign markets.
There have been plans and proposals for "managed" curr-
encies, divorced from gql<3 and emitted by so^e central au-
thority in amounts sufficient to m^et co mercial needs. Some-
thing of the kind now exists (usually without much real man-
age ent , it is true) inside the boundaries of countries wljich
use no>-> -convert ible paper of silver money. But as between
nations there is no central authority to regulate the amount
issued or to enforce its acceptance. The peal difficulty,
one is tempted to believe, lies not primarily with the
standard itself, but with restraining people from creating
more obligations than they can pay. '-''Ms is the basic prob-
1. Scribners: The Gold. Standard Under Fire, Nov. 1931. p. 56
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lem which any monetary system Will have to deal with.
Credits, based upon the normal exchange of goods at
fairly well stabilized prices become frozen when the spe-
cific commodities used as collateral shrank to but a frac-
tion of their former price value. Debts that were contracted
in goor : faith to procure a given quantity of wheat or cotton
became tieayy burdens when the value of the goods represented
only fifty or sixty per cent of the credit used for its
purchase. As price? fell precipitously, the liquidation of
fixed dollar ebligatiena required huge increases in the
r-uantitative exchange of goods, but business contracted
rather than expanded, and the credits supported by goods
as collateral, restedupon a foundation trat was weaker in-
inherent strength, and actually too small to support the
superstructure it was intended to uphold.
Gold played a pernicious role in the tragedy, particular-
ly international trade. With the Western World attempting
to maintain a gold standard for the value of international
exchanges, every contract between nrt-ions called for payment
either in gold or in tremendously increased quantities of
gold to be sold to the creditor nation. If. for example,
3 nglish cotton manufacturers purchased raw materials or fin-
ished goods on a. nin ety-day loan of sr;10C,000 and if, between
the time of purchasing of the raw materials and sale of
finished products a general decline o" 26% in prices occurred,
the liquidation of the original loan required an increase of
26% in English exports.
/
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1
^nly when a business depression is the direct re-
sult of a money problem will the correction of that money
probler "bring wit 1 it companionate improvement in tmde.
That, was true in 1907. It is not so true now. Then the
money system of the °nited States. w«s unsound in principle
and as inflexible as a steel column. xhe Aldri ch-Vreeland
act and the subsequent Federal Reserve System have removed
r: o st of the trouble inherent in 1907. Until the Spring of
1931 the problem of the present depression was one of tr^de.
^ince May, 1931, the debacle of the money and credit system
both in Europe and America has imposed tremendous handicaps
upon business.
Ij
-'he process of delfation (or increasing
value of money) developed so rapidly that commodities offer-
ed as collateral represented only a fraction of the original
loans made. The lack of demand, combined with the tumbling
of gold. prices and products and the structure of the credit
system, imposed its burden with telling force upon the bus-
2
iness str cture. Unlike the conditions of 1907 those of
1931 came not from lack of money, but from the almost com-
plete breakdown of the currency and credi t mechanism in Its
relation to business. An improvement in money and credit
would be of enormous assistance. In international affairs,.
1. Current History:
'
1
'he gold Crisis Nov. p. 170
2. Ibid, p 172.
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particularly , the over throw of the artificial harrier
created by gold parity would be most salut^rv. In dom-
estic husineps the correction of currency and credit would
be of great value to solvency and stahlized prices, but a
permanent constructive aid only if tr-de henefited from
so'"ie stimulus. As a matter of fact, the improvement of
trade would go far in the solution of the money and credit
problem, whereas no such result would he inherent necessarily
in the efforts to patch the credit machine or to inflate
currency
.
For America, the problem is one of more than passing
interest. As a matter of fact the action of the British
Parliament on September 21, contains as many elements of
direct crncern as though it were the act of official Wash-
ington itself. The threat of t v e loss of foreign markets
and increased competition in American markets, which in spite
o f the tariff, may come t rough the depreciation of European
exchange will promote wage reductions as part of a campaign
to lower American costs to meet the emergency. That is the
most obvious method and it is not unreasonable to assume that
the wage reduction of 10 per cent announced by the United
^tate^ Steel Corporation on September 22, 1931 one day after
the gold edict was in part at least stimulated by the fear
of increased British and other European competition.
1
There is another method by which America might seek to
encompass the same result of maintaining her competetive posi-
tion by following the exact method used by England and abandon-
1. Cu-rent
"
: istory, The Gold Crisis, Nov. 1931, p. 171
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ing the gold standard of exchange. Such a plan may seem
fantastic in view of the gold supplies of this country;
but the suggestion does not seem entirely far-fetched if
the situation is examined somewhat more closely. It is
a fact of economic history that cheap mo^ey always seeks
exchange for more expensive money. If a substantial
portion of the world should depart from a gold basis', there
would he created a decided movement to exchange large sums
of this flat money for American gold. Moreover, with the
increased attractiveness of the countries with depreciated
currency as markets for world buyers, the actual exports of
America might decline, imports increase and the adverse bal-
ance create a drain on the gold of the United States. This
would be particularly true if American efforts to reduce costs
through increased efficiency and wage reductions we^e not
sufficiently successful or m~t increasing and effective re-
sistance from labor.
There are many who measure the Security and wealth of
this country in the gold reserves within the vaults of the
central banks. Serious inroads wou 1 d unquestionably ini-
tiate some protective measures, nnd the obvious method would
lie in the refusal to honor foreign drafts of gold.
There are other reasons for suggesting the possibility
of America abandonment of a gold standard. The introduc-
tion of flat money is one of the simplest devices for in-
flation, as its supply need have no such restrictive limits
as that of gold. If the money value decreased, prices would
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of course increase. Decreasing value of money is but
another way of saying advancing prices of commodities.
Security prices would increase, commodity prices would
increase. *he dual phenomenon would automatically enhance
the value of collateral held by the banks and thereby re-
duce the threat to their solvency as well as that of n any
of the debtors. The dollar volume of the sane quantity of
business " ;ould automatically become greater and the fixed
charges and labor costs would become less. Wage reductions,
devaluation of bonded indebtedness and all fixed capital
charges would be a f«ct without individual action or pro-
bably even adverse criticism. National bankruptcy would
be core a fact and creditors won 1 d. be raid that rercer.tage
on the dolla~ in real purchasing power with the new
value of m-ney in relation to the old . In effect this
series of events is what occurs during any period of rising
prices except tratif Jicney were inflated there would not be
necessarily any improvement in trade and when prices increase
through active trade more labor is available and there are
more products to be distributed.
1
It would be far better if some stimulus to trade could
be created and effected that would lu-'cken the pulse of in-
dustry and bring back to America and the world, employment,
profits and finally increased prices born of increased de-
mand. The improvement of ^rices that coves with an increase
1. The Gold Crisis: Current Hirtory Nov. 1931, p. 1^2
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in business activity would mean the maintenance or even
the improvement of standards of living. Industry would
be in a more favorable position because it would be
operating upon production schedule" tr which its mechanism
was adjusted. Inflating prices t> rough demoneti zatim or
devaluation of the dollar is tinged with the same fallacious
social point of view that is inherent in the advocacy of
horizontal reduction in production as a capitalistic method
of correcting the depression, loth propose that the nation
cut its cloth to s1 shrinking pattern. Botl 1 suggest lowering
purchasing power for labor not so enthusiastically the
contraction of capital structures to a small scale. Both ere
retrogressive, and both are necessary only when depression
must be accepted as inevitable or is the normal mistakes of
a competetive expanding industrial mechanism.

XCONSEQUENCES 0 F BRITISH DECISION
0 B M E R I C A
1
Those countries not on the gold standard will buy BriT-
tish goods, and e»ch other's, in preference to Ame lean goods,
because they have to pay less gold for . them. American ex-
porters, and export industries are already beginning to feel
th°t effects In cancellation of orders. These advantages will
last only so long as prices in Britain do not rise as fast
as the value of the pound depreciates, or so lor.g ps prices
in the gold holding countries do not fall as f r-st as the pound
declines
.
Since Soviet Russia has never been on a gold standard,
she will switch her trade where pes sible to the countries
that have abandoned it, except as she secures more liberal
credit terms from the gold standard countries.
Third, further deflation, of commodity prices in the
countries still on a gold standard. This is seen already
in American wheat and cotton markets, and may come in
copper, depending upon how much Britain will rely upon the
American supply. It is seen in rubber *>nd tin also, since
Holland, still on gold, controls so much of the sunnily. Hence
it is problematical whether the Dutch will stick by gold and
see their rubber plantations further ruined.
As the countries off gold buy their wheat, cotton, rubber,
tin, and copper from other non-gold countries, or from their
1. The Business Week, Gold, October 7, 1931.
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colonies also off gold, the supplies of these commodities
controlled by gold countries are backing up on the market
and falling in price. nhis has "been intensified by the in-
stability of the exchanges and di sorganizati on of the machin-
ery of international payment, which will last as lonp- as
the pound is not established at some figure or until an in-
ternational conference is called to repair the machinery of
exchange .
Fourth, tightening of interest rates in all money mar-
kets. Foreign banks, unable to withdraw London balances with-
out loss due to further depression of the pound are liquidat-
ing balances on short-term loans in other banking centers,
chiefly Naw York, and accumulating gold to strengthen their
re se rve s
.
In addition central bank rediscount rates abroad have
been sharply raised to cut down currency in circulation,
force domestic liquidation, and attract foreign deposits.
In the United States the Federal Reserve System is being
subjected not only to the strain of these foreign withdrawals,
but to s persistently increasing internal hoarding demand
for currency, and for reserve credit in the form of member
bank borrowing to meet commercial and crop moving requirements.
The Federal Reserve System has met this multiple de-
mand for funds in the Hew York market by taking bills, given
and by increased rediscounts and has so far only advanced its
bill buying rate. If the demand continues it will be necess-
ary to buy government securities to offset the tightening of
the market, unless the rediscount rate is to be raised.
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The outflow of earmarking of gold for foreign account
in itself would be a good thing If it were offset by credit
expansion here. But such redistribution of our gold hoard
will probably be tenporar,', especially if interest ^stes
rise here.
Althourh in August of 1931 imports of merchandise
slightly erceeder" exports, tourist expenditures, Immigrant
remittances, interest and dividend payments abroad ar.d cer-
tainly foreign credits have all declined, so that the pres-
ence for inward movement of funds has increased. In addi-
tion, the flight of foreign capital here for safety is likely
to grow, so that a continued inflow of gold is probable.
All this, taken in connection with the tidal wave
of wage cuts, means further deflation in thus country, as
commodity prices decline, foreign trade is furt er hampered
and credit becomes more costly and scarce.

XI
A MERICAN G OLD STANDARD I MP R EGNABL E
1.
"The man who helped a do^en nations back to monetary
stability has told the United States that the American gold
standard and dollar are virtually impregnable. So strong are
they, said Dr. Edwin W. Kemmerer of Princeton University, in
a speech before the Advertising Club, that the United States
now has tl eopportunity of replacing London as the world's
financial center."
In America, we have the largest supply of monetary gold
of any country in the world, and the largest supply that any
country has ever held in the history of the world. Until
September, 1931, this stock has been increasing month by
month with only an occasional slight interruption since the
summer of 1928. we have recently lost seven hundred millions
of this gold, but this amount is only about fourteen per cent
of our September maximum holdings and merely puts us back to
about the figure we ha d in January of 1931.
The gold reserves of our Federal Reserve Banks are still
more than a billion dollars above legal reserve requirements
and we have outstanding hundreds of millions of gold certifi-
cates for which we can easily substitute Federal Reserve notes
thereby still further increasing the supply of freely avail-
able gold. We still have an excessive amount of gold, not
because we reached out and grabbed it, but chiefly because
Boston Transcript Nov. 17, 1931.
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so much has come to us for safe keeping. The difficulty
at present is one of confidence. Much of our gold is still
comparatively idle, hut it will be put to work when people
abfoad and people at home come to "believe it can be put to
work safely and profitably.
The gold stardnrd in the United States today is strong,
very strong, and the fears entertained by some timid persons
and by some ignorant persons at home, as well as the fears
publicly expressed by some envious per..sons and by some ignor-
ant persons abroad, of the possible breakdown of t v e American
gold standard have no justification whatever in the cold facts
of the situation.
There are few things more foolish than for anyone
actually to hoard gold in a country with such a large gold
supply as the United States and with such a strong credit
position in relation to the rest of the world. The hoarding
of paper money in the United States is likewise foolish. All
of our paper money in addition to the other assets b - ck of
it, enjoys the guaranty of the United States Government it-
self, and our national government meets its obligations.
Hoarded money is always in danger of being stolen and
it earns no inter' st. The proper* place for small savings ia
in a bank, but in case there is no bank in a town, or in case
for good reasons a person loses confidence in the accessible
banks and has decided, therefore, to withdraw his deposits,
he should not hoard the money withdrawn, but, rather, deposit
it in his local postal savings bank and enjoy the absolute
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guarantee of the United States Government itself.
7iVer since the war New York has been gaining on
London as a center for international finance. The shock
given to the financial world by Treat Britain's recent
suspension of gold payments and the difficulty of carry-
ing on international financial operations through the
intermediation of a paper money standard will deprive Lon-
«
don for a long time, if not permanently of her premier
position as the world's money market center.
This position is now being offered New York. The
United States has a well-organized banking system. In
recent years, we have been engaging increasingly in the
field of international finance, and we have many men, par-
ticularly young men, of training and experience in this
field. The all- important question is: Have our bankers
enough knowledge of international finance, enough experi-
ence, enough vision and enough financial leadership to take
the position that London is now passinp over to us? It is
our opportunity and our responsibility.
f
XII
SUMMARY OP THE EFFECTS OF THE GOLD STANDARD TJPOH
THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF THE UNITED
STATES.
The effects of the gold standard upon the economic
development of the United States have been numerous and
varied. I think that it is safe to say all of these effects
have been of a beneficial nature and at the present writing
I cannot see any re-son why the gold standard should not
continue to aid in the economic development of the United
State s
.
It is because gold has been found, in the evolution
of events, to be the best medium of deferred payments that
contracts are nrde in gold rather than in other articles.
Contracts for other commodities have usually been leptal nrd
have sore times been made: but in the overwhelming majority
of cases gold has been preferred, because it has remained
the most exchangeable of commodities and its fluctuations
in purchasing powe^- have been to some extent calculable.
Gold performs the function of deferred payments by providing
a medium of payment tha t will assure the seller certainty
as to the form of payment that will induce him to part vr* th
his goods; for no man will sell unless he feels certain of
the purchasing power of that which he will receive in return
Gold is the standard of deferred payiaefvfca on account of its
unchanging character.
In examining the varirus projects which have been nd-
v^nced from time to time for steadying the purchasing power
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of gold, it becomes clear that there is much conflict of
opinion over even the definitions wH ch describe the
character of the changes. It is often declared that gold
ha s appreciated in value when a given amount of gold will
purchase a larger amount of commodities than before. In
a restricted sense, this definition of the "appreciation of
gold" is correct. y"hen gold will exchange for more commodi-
ties than on some previous occasim
,
it has undoubtedly
appreciated with reference to those commodities. But an
appreciation of gold with reference to those commodities
may be due to causes having no direct relation to gold, but
related to the production or stock of commodities. If a
given commodity has been produced beyond the limits of effec-
tive demand, so that tT->ere is a surplus stock on the market,
its price falls in gold, and it may be said in a sense that
gold has appreciated wl th reference to this particular com-
modity; but the peal cause of the change is obviously not
found in the production of gold or anything directly affect-
ing that metal, but in influences affecting the commodity wh 1 ch
is measured in gold.
One of the most important functions of gold and the
gold standard is the way in which it operates on deferred
payments . Gold performs the function of deferred payments
by providing a medium of payment that will assure to the
seller certainty as to the form of payment that will in-
duce him to part with his goods: for no man will sell
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unless he feels certain of the purchasing power of that which
he will receive in return. Thus, we can see how the gold
standard is encouraging trade and credit by stabilizing them
because of its unquestionable stability of value. No business
can go on unless there is absolute confidence on the part of
both the seller and buyer in regard to the method and kind
of payment. Since the gold standard furnishes business -"ith
this necessary incentive, it certainly is performing a most
i portant economic service. Gold is the standard of deferred
payments on account of its unchanging character.
So much has been said about the purchasing power of
money that we cannot mention our money system without-think-
ing about its pur charing power. I think that the buying
power of money is going to fluctuate regardless of what stand-
ard of money we are on. I also think that the fluctuations
are going to be minimized in any country that conducts its
money scheme on the gold standard. Gold, is subject to fewer
changes in purchasing power than any other substance since
the quantity does not fluctuate violently. Therefore, the
United States since it is on the gold standard, is going to
have a fairly stable purchasing power, which in turn will aid
in stabilizing business. The wealth value of purchasing powe^
of go 1 d is determined mainl: 7 by the d©stand for it for monetar?/-
purposes. The industrial demand takes quite a secrndary and
subordinate place.
(
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The refunding of bonds is sometimes measured by the
amount of gold reserves thin the vaults of t ve central
hanks. Of course, this is not the only measurement by
which we estimate the efunding of bonds, but nevertheless
it is a most important factor when v/e talk about refunding
bonds. The fact that we are on the gold standard, gives
people confidence to buy bonds, and if they did not have a
feeling of security when buying, there would unquestionably
be serious inroads initiated for some protective tries sure s
.
It would be rather difficult to refund long-term bonds if
the value of gold fluctuated too frequently and too broadly.
If we had a money that kept decreasing, it would be another
way o p sa:?ing that bond prices would increase. This would
enhance the value of the collateral held for the bonds
and thereby reduce the solvency of many debtors. This in
turn would mean that fixed charges won id become less and
there would be a devaluation of bonded 3 Indebtedness . Fixed
charges ,vould be a fact without individual action or pro-
bably even adverse criticism. All of these things ,rould
hurt the refunding of bonds. Creditors would only be paid
that percentage on the dollar in repl purchasing power with
the new value of money in relation to the old. Dut, with
a fairly stable gold standard the Ganger of not refunding
bonds dollar for dollar is greatly minimized.
Although there are many contributing causes for the in-
creases in National Banks, I think the gold standard has
been a most important factor in their pheonomenal growth.
It i s true that before we went on the gold standard, the
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United tafces had many National Banks, and they probably
would have been a great many even if we were not using
gold as our basic money, ^ut , the feeling of security which
comes with the use of gold as money, has given bankers and
government officials the courage and confidence to extend
their growth throughout the entire United States. The
National Banks have increased also because there has been,
and still is, less danger of bank ^ailure due to the well
known inherent qualities of gold. The value of gold has
reamined relatively constant; there have been no conflicting
double standards and there has been no serious danger of
large fluctuations in the amount of gold in this countr--.
All of these things have come shout partly as a result of
our gold standard, and, because these things are all economi-
cally sound, they have helped to increase the number of
National Banks in the United States; and the banks in turn
have helped to increase the economic activity of the American
people.
The increased capitalization of any bank may be due
to a. number of causes, but it is a certainty that no bank is
going to keep its increased capitalization unless the money
system of the countr^ which it is operating on i? -ound
.
The gold standard, of theUnited States is a sound money s:rstem
and. it has been a most important contributing factor in the
growth of capital in our National Banks. If our use of gold
as money could not stand the attacks of the rules of economics
we could not hope to have much of an industrial country.
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If we did not have an industrial nation, we wou'd not have
large amounts of capital. But, the very fact, that our
gold standard is economically sound, .Ame ri canbu sines s men
have hp d the faith and courage to go ahead and build up a
commercial nation, as well as an industrial nation, &xtra
capital has been one of their foremost thoughts and it has
driven them on to such an extent that they gained more money
than could profitably be used. Much of this money that could
not economically be used has gone into National ^anks. 1his
money, first of all, only increased the deposits of the
various National Banks. But, as this money was VSter wisely
used by them, profits resulting from the increased d^osits
went toward increased capitalization. The banks probably
would never have ?d this capitalization if the United States
was not on a gold standard because our business enterprises
would never have been able to flourish, as they have, on a
weak money system. therefore, while it is true that the
gold standard was an indirect cause for the increased cap-
italization of our National Banks, it is also true that the
direct causes for their increased capitalization would never
have been so apparent if we were on a standard less sound
than gold.
When we speak of gold in terms of foreign countries,
international trade, and international payments, we in-
variably think of the rate of exchange. There are many countries
other than the United States wbo are on a gold standard but
who use different measurements in deciding the value cf gold.
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Consequently we must have some method of determining the
value of one country's coins to another. We, therefore,
have established what is commonly known as a rate of ex-
change. By being on a gold standard, a country will find
that the normal rate of exchange is both invariable and
definitely calculable without the aid of index numbers.
The rate of exchange is definitely calculable because of
the stability of gold. -Lt is not constant!:?- fluctuating
either in the amount cf it or in the value of it. and these
things make it possible to figure what the r^te of ey change
will be in th<*. future. The value of such a tiling as this
is nt once apparent. r.1erc'~ants can foresee a. possible pi se
or fall in prices and can protect themselves with this know-
ledge. A definite calculation of the rate of exchange also
aids in stabilizing business because it acts as a check
or a guide for future transactions. The possible variations
from the normal rate are themselves capable of being pre-
dicted and expressed in definite terms.
Historically, it is the relative fixity of the exchanges
under a gold standard which has furnished the main incentive
for numerous countries to establish or restore the gold stand-
ard. If the gold standard was not sound in itself, we ould
never had a historical fixity of the exchanges. T f t-e fix-
ity of exchanges are so important t at they furnish p country
with on incentive to establish or restore a gold standard,
then we cannot help but recognize how important gold is to sny
I
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country in the world regardless of whether or not it is
on the gold, standard. We would not have the fixity of
the exchanges If we did not have gol<"', and we probably
would not have so much stability of international trade
if we did not have the fixity of the-exchanges . But, the
majority of our fixities and stabilities go back to our
gold standard we probably would not have them if we were
on any other standard.
The gold standard in it°elf is not a direct cause
for increases in bark deposits but it certainly is an im-
portant contributing factor. It is true thajj bank deposits
may be increased or decreased due to a variet~r of economic
happenings, but, I believe that the use of gold as money has
been a factor of considerable importance in creating la^ge
deposits. People deposit money in banks because they are con-
vinced that banks are relatively safe, but people would not
make these deposits if they thought the banks could lower the
value of their money. People deposit money in the banks be-
cause of the intere-t they receive on it. Again they would
not leave their money in a bank if the gold value was going
to be lowered because of the intere-t they receive on their
deposits. In other words, the gold standard has helped to
increase bank deposit? because the people feel that t v e banks
cannot, to any serious extent, alter the value rf their money.
The gold standard has put trustfulness and confidence in the
people to such an extent that they put their money in banks,
and the banks in turn use t! ese deposits for loan purposes
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which go a long way in aiding the economic development of
the United States.
Since our money standard is based upon gold, I think
it is safe to say that the amount of money in ci rcul« tion
in the United States is partly due to the gold standard. I
say partly because I ' am aware of the fact that notes and
bonds have increased the amount of fund^ in this country to
an almost unbelievable sum. J»ith each new discovery of gold,
the amount of money in circulation will naturally increase.
It is also true that if we were on silver standard, each
new discovery of silver would increase the amount of money
in a country. But, it would be necessary to discover sixteen
times as nnch silver as gold, to cause the ^ame increase in
the amount of money in a country. Therefore, since the United
States is on a gold standard, it is easy to see that, e ^ch new
small discovery cf gold will increase the amount of gold money
in circulation even though the gold may be di scovered abroad.
This i s so because the ma jority of foreign countries are debtors
to the United States which means they must pay us in gold if
they do not pay us in commodities. This increase of money
helps to develop us both economically and go vernmen tally . The
gold standard increases the amount of money in circulation since
it has greater value than any other metal; and with each in-
crease in the circulation of money we grow economically be-
cause we have more money with which to expand. The gold stand-
ard also increased the amount of money in circulation because
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of its stable value. People usually do not hoard because
they have been assured that the value of gold does not
fluctuate enough to make hoarding necessary. They orobably
put their extra money in banks and the banks in turn send it
out for further circulation.
The vsiue of gold in relation to other articles is re-
flected by prices. Price is a relationship between the ex-
changeable value of an object at any riven time and th* ex-
changeable value at the same time of the metal of whi et money
is composed. The relation between gold and other commodities
is constantly changing, as are the relations of these other
commodities to e r- ch other. There is almost constantly a
slight misdirection of production, which, from day to day,
creates a little more of one commodity, or a little less of
another, than is demanded at current prices. The influence
of this over-^oduction or scant supply corrects itself through
changes in prices, but those changes occur before the remedy
is effectively applied. These prices are the test of the de-
mand for products and not a test for the demand of gold. It
is contended by those who seek for an ideal money that their
aim is not to elimirate fluctuations in prices which arise from
changes in commodities, but to eliminate the fluctuations
which grow out of the character of gold as merchandise and
out of the irregularity of its production. It is ver;r dif-
ficult to separate, in either theory or practice, the one
class of fluctuations from the other. While it is true that
the productions have been irregular, its irregularities
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are not ne«r so numerous as are variations in other com-
modities. Since its inception as a money in this country
gold has maintained a fairly steady price scale and has
helped other products to stay on one nrice scale. When
people talk about price changes and blame them on to gold
they are m^ staken; they mean price changes in the commodi-
ties which gold will buy. While undoubtedly there has been
a gradual change in the relation of gold to commodities as
a whole, extending over long periods of time, the change has
not been radical enough to cause any serous in.iur: 7 to our
money standard.
Our Federal Reserve System and the use of gold as a.
money ptandard have beep closel: 7- linked together since the
beginning of the Federal Reserve System, "hUe it may be
true that we would have had a system of reserve banks even
if we were not on a gold standard, I think the adoption of
gold as a stardard in this country has helped the development
of our reserve system to e large extent. First of all, it
has given the people who formed this system something definite
on which to base the requirements for bonds, deposits, capital,
interest rates, rediscount rates, loars, notes, and reserves.
Gold has also partly determined the growth of these banks.
These banks cannot form or grow without a certain amount of
gold. In other words, the gold standard helps to decide when
or when not a Federal Reserve Bank may he found. £y aiding
or hindering in a decision of this kind, the gold standard
makes itself an important factor in the policies of our
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government and our businesses because the federal Reserve
System is the most important arrangement of banks in the
United State*,
The gold etandard in the United States has been of con-
siderable help it the expansion of credit and currency. The
increased <5upoly of monetary gold has created vast potentiali-
ties of currency and deposit credit expansion of wnlcn the
country has availed itself largely to buy bonds. As the
increased supplies of gold have come here, we have grown
richer. As we have grown richer, our credit and currency
has grown stronger and as we have grown stronger, our
credit and currency has expanded because of their strength.
Bank credit and currency expands when transitions are to be
accomplished. An enormous volume of bank credit has been
required to finance the shifting of indust^ from peace
occupations to war occupations, to finance the huge receipts
and disbursements of the treasury, to ease the tension of
.tax paymenl s , to enable business men to liquidate slow assets
while changing the character of their production ^nd meeting
the burden of taxe^ and loans. Expansion of bank credit is
necessitated by the hoarding of deposits by business men
who feel the necessity of keeping in an unusually liquid
position in times of stress and uncertainty . T t ia certain,
that gold, by aiding credit and currency expansion, has done
its part with doing away with demoralization and chaos, '-i-he
feol ': standard, itself economizes use of gold by employing bank
credit as 0 substitute.

100.
Wages and labor have also received the benefits of
the gold standard in the United States because it has
given us something definite to measure wages with. It
has also helped both the employer and the employee to es-
timate what their worth is to each other. It has aided
in stabilizing wages because of the stable qualit:^ of gold.
The wage earning class can realize the cost of living in
terms of gold and then can seeV a wage according to it. By
the gold standard raising our standard of living, it has in
turn raised the vages of the majority of the workers who are
on a wage scale. With the resultant rise in wages, the
workers are ^ble to save more money and to spend more money :
and these things in turn-aid in t he economic development of this
country. Gold has helped to give labor the quality of
stability that it will always need. No country which lacks
a definite money ytandard can hope to have satisfactory labor.
Labor must bebaseduron something d efinite in the line of
money, and the gold standard in this country is the basis. If
labor was not satisfied with this standard, or if we had a
standard of money which held the laboring class down too much,
we would never have been able to accomplish all that ™e have.
Labor is a most important cog in economics and if our labor
is not economically sound we cannot hope for much progress.
The use o f g old has aided in giving labor a soundness and
stability that has withstood industrial revolutions, wars,
and changing standards of living.
Almost everyone who talks about the gold standard talks
about its stability. Stability is one of the chief identifi-
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cation characteristics of gold. In spite of onr fairly fre-
quent business cycles, and regardless of money inflations
and depreciations, the valuo of gold has remained very stable.
It has withstood the onslaught of wars and commodity price
fluctuations in a manner which has proved beyond any question
of douht that told alwsyi keeps its unflinching stability,
'•hi^e prices of commodities have gone up or down according to
demand and supply, or according to over-prod^ ction or under-
production, the price of gold has kept itself maints ' ned on
a steady level. Upti^ people confute the stability of gold
m%.th commodity prices. Some of them think tl^at because there
v as been a -i^e or drop in the cost of materials which a>e
up our econo ic world, that the stabilit;- of gold is not so
apparent, '^is is not true. It is the value of these com-
modities that is fluctuating and not the value of gold. The
stability of gold helps to maintain a steady price level be-
cause of its almost perfect unvarying value; it helps to keep
purchasing power on a definite stand; snd it gives people con-
fidence in the gold standard because trey know their dollar
is not going to change too much in value over-night. The gold
standard tries to insure stability by tying the value of money
to gold.
Gold has placed American business on a firmer economic
standing than is probably imaginable . It has given business
mgn pnd the government the courage to go ahead wi th almost
an;- financial enterprise that has sounded economic. For one
thing business has been given something definite on which
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to decide the value of anything. By giving stability to
money, gold has given stability to business because money
is probably the most important factor in any business en-
terprise. The capitalists are able to calculate in advance
the rate of exchange and thus plan his future transaction
s
accordingly, he gold standard has also helped the commer-
cial undertakings of America in the folio-wing indirect ways:
By aiding ban' s, by financing international tr^de, by grant-
ing credit, by loaning money and by keeping prices stable.
Gold has served as a medium of exchange for international
payments for su ch a long time and has served its purpose so
well tha t there is no Question of doubt ^s to its economic
value, not only to the United States, but to foreign countries
as well. The settlement of international payments by gold
has given the United States something definite on which to
figure what is owed to her by debtor countries and what she
owes to creditor countries. By making and receiving payments
in gold, we are enabled to save time and money because of
the fact that we are on the gold standard. Settling inter-
national payment? by go ; d also makes it possible to figure bal-
ances far in advance of when they are dne, and trus the
business man has the opportunity to plan his future foreign
trade accordingly. Settling payments by gold is an in-
valuable method to governments. It helps them to plan their
budgets, taxes, receipts and disbursements since the:* know
definitely what is due them from foreign countries and what
they .owe to creditor nations. Large values in gold, are
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also transportable in small bulk. This is a true aconorr ic
advantage because it reduces expense and saves space.
Our gold standard has been one of the prime factors
in. our international trade. It has been a prime factor in
our in ternati on 8 1 tr^de because it is the basis upon which
we buy and sell with foreign countries. Without something
definite to figure prices on, international tr^ de would al-
most be an impossibility. Gold, because of its definite value,
facilitates the growth and expansion of international trade,
by allowing foreign trade merchants to make long tern agree-
ments without being hampered by the thought of two different
money standards. Gold is also of especial importance to
the United States in international tr^de because we export
more goods than we import, which means we receive more gold
than \ e pay out. The resultant flow of gold into this
country makes us a richer nation and gives us surplus mor- ey
with which to carry on any governmental or industrial ex-
pansion which may be necessary. Gold also helps us in for-
eign trade since our banking facilities are based upon a
gold standard.
The use of gold as a medium of exchange has helped to
lower interest rates and ha. s aided in keeping them at a stable
level. By creating a credit and currency expansion, the gold
standard has out considerably more money in this country than
would normally be here. Thus, if money is plentiful as it
is in the United States, interest rates a^e going to be low
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if the supply is greater than the demand. If the amount of
money in circulation does not vary, there is no normal r«ae-
on why the interest rate should vary. Thus, by interest
rates remaining- low and stable, it encourages people to
use more money, and if this interest charged money is used
to good advantage, then the entire nation is goin^ to benefit
from it. Usually, the things which hold true for interest
rates also hold true for rediscount rates.
Gold is essentially a standard of relative values
rather than absolute values. As such it forms as perfect
a measure as is practically attainable because it is not
subject to large and sudden variations on the side of suoply.
The variations on the side of demand are the reflection
of changes in the production and consumption of other commodi-
ties and are in their essence one of the repulat inp forces
of production. V7hen this character of gold as a standard
of relative values rather than absolute values is frankly
recognized, it ceases to be necessary to attribute fluctua-
tions in the value of commodities to changes inherent in
gold itself. Imperfect as a gold currency may be in theory,
subject to accidental fluctuations in the production of the
metal and changes in the relations between the quantity of
money and the volume of transactions, it is probable that
it secures more perfect justice in its actual operation than
would any other substitute system.
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